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Summary
This thesis presents two distinct essays on informal credit intermediation in
developing economies and its implication for the conduct of monetary policy.
Broadly, the study investigated the implication of informal credit intermediation
on effective monetary policy. Available data reveal that informal credit interme-
diation has increased over the period. The IMF Financial Stability Board (2014)
report revealed that the volume of financial intermediation via the non-bank sec-
tor in several economies has been increasing over the past decades. The report
estimated informal intermediation to be about 40 per cent of total bank interme-
diation in the world. Notwithstanding the growth of the informal financial sector
in most economies, the literature is salient on their role in monetary transmission.
Therefore, this topic has become most relevant in the literature and for policymak-
ers to understand the role played by these financial intermediaries in transmitting
monetary impulses to the real sector.
The first chapter presented a brief review of relevant literature on monetary
effectiveness in developing economies. The chapter further presented the financial
structure of Ghana and discussed its implication for monetary transmission.
The second chapter empirically investigated the effect of informal credit in-
termediation on monetary transmission process in Ghana. Given the growth of
informal credit activities in Ghana coupled with their interrelationship with the
traditional banking system, their operations could have some direct or indirect
effect on monetary policy. Particularly because, informal credit institutions are
seen to operate similar to the traditional (formal) banks, even though their op-
erations are not fully regulated by the central bank like traditional banks. The
study employed a Factor Augmented Vector Auto-regression modeling approach
and found that though interest rate pass-through is very weak, the presence of
informal credit intermediation further dampens it. This suggests that informal
credit intermediation contributes to the less effective monetary policy evident in
Ghana.
The third chapter set-up a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model to include formal and informal banks. In line with their operations, the
formal bank is modeled to operate with the rich agents in the economy whiles the
informal bank operates with the poor agents. The banks operate parallel with each
other in the intermediation process except that the formal bank is regulated by
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the central bank whiles the informal bank is not. This modeling strategy helped
to identify the effect of monetary shocks in the presence of informal credit inter-
mediation. Also, the study investigated how credit shock from both the informal
and formal sector affect the aggregate economy. The study found that monetary
shocks affect the formal financial sector differently from the informal sector. How-
ever, credit shock from the formal and informal sector has similar effect on the
economy.
The thesis concluded by discussing further possible applications and extension.
2
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1
Background
1.1 Introduction
Monetary policy, following the pioneer work of Friedman and Schwartz (1963),has remained an integral part of modern theoretical and empirical economic
research. Particularly because, monetary policy remains the major tool used by
government of various countries to achieve low inflation, favorable interest rate
and exchange rate, and sustained economic growth.
The financial sector forms an integral part in the conduct of monetary policy.
Particularly because, financial institutions mediate in monetary implementation
strategy by transmitting monetary impulses to the real economy. This role is
founded on the robust positive relationship between long-term movement in broad
money growth and its association with risks to price stability which borders enor-
mously on banks’ behavior. Therefore, the behavior of financial institutions- par-
ticularly the banks, are instrumental in the conduct of effective monetary policy.
The financial sector of most economies especially that of developing countries
are characterized by large informal credit activities. There are evidences of for-
mal financial institutions co-existing with large informal financial institutions in
African, Asia and other part of the world. Studies show that the informal financial
sector is large and growing (Chipeta & Mkandawire, 1991; African development
report, 1994; Aryeetey, 1994; Chipeta, 1998). The pace of growth of the infor-
mal sector even outweighs that of the formal sector. This is established by field
surveys carried out in Malawi by Chipeta and Mkandawire (1991), in Ghana by
Aryeetey (1994), and in Nigeria by Soyibo (1997). The growth in size of the in-
formal credit sector is also reflected in the share of total credit intermediation. In
recent times, the IMF Financial Stability Board (2014) report estimated the size
of the global shadow banking system to be about 40 percent of the total finan-
cial system. Although data is sparse, anecdotal evidences suggest similar trend in
Ghana. For example, the amount of loans extended by Non-Bank Financial Insti-
tutions (NBFIs) increased from GHc70.63 million in 2003 to GHc72.85 million in
2004, suggesting 3.1 percent growth. In 2006, a total of GHc160.47 million was
extended to clients, which represents 48.8 percent higher than the previous year’s
total loans and advances granted by these micro-finance institutions. The upward-
trend of NBFI’s credits to individuals, small businesses, groups and others indicate
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marked improvements in the level of micro-finance and the gradual growth in total
financial assets in the country. Overall, figures from Bank of Ghana indicate that
the share of micro-finance loans and advances as a percentage of total assets of
banks and NBFI loans and advances has increased from 4.8 percent in 2008 to 9.8
percent in 2013.
The share and size of informal credit, and their interaction with the formal sec-
tor, may cause the response of formal sector to policy to be non-trivial, with the
consequent effect on economic activities not obviously determined. The response
may vary depending on whether the informal financial sector is autonomous or
reactive to the formal sector (Rahman, 1992, 1994); whether the two sectors exist
as complementary or competitive; and whether the nature of their interaction frus-
trates or strengthens monetary policy. Unfortunately, the literature is salient on
the role of informal finance in the monetary transmission process. Questions that
remain unanswered include: does informal credit mar or ease monetary transmis-
sion? Does the existence of informal credit affects the trajectory of shocks in an
economy? This thesis contributes to the literature by investigating these questions.
The term informal credit is used in this thesis to refer to financial activities
of deposit and non-deposit taking institutions that mobilize and lend financial re-
sources, that take place outside universal banking, and are not directly amenable to
the required reserve regulation of the central bank of Ghana. Encompassed in this
definition are Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs), Rural and Community
Banks (RCB), rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), micro-finance
institutions, among others.
The thesis is structured in three chapters, each tackling relevant portion of
the questions raised above. This chapter one reviews the literature on monetary
transmission and describes the financial structure of Ghana by presenting the inter-
actions among the financial institutions that provides the foundation for this study.
Chapter two empirically investigates factors that influence monetary effectiveness
and identify the effect of informal credit intermediation on monetary transmission.
Chapter three studies the effect of exogenous shocks in an economy with informal
credit intermediation using a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
framework.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 briefly reviews
some literature on monetary policy effectiveness. Section 1.3 presents the financial
structure of Ghana and discuss its implication for the conduct of effective monetary
policy in Ghana.
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1.2 Literature Review
Monetary policy all over the world is conducted using an indirect approach. In
the indirect framework, monetary authorities through their influence on money
market conditions as the issuer of reserve money (currency in circulation and
deposit balances with the central bank) adjust the underlying supply conditions
of bank reserves to affect a desired outcome. In this regards, policy effectiveness
requires that the link between monetary policy instrument and its target, i.e. the
transmission mechanism, should be smooth. Monetary transmission, which is also
referred as the pass-through, is the quantitative measure of monetary authorities
actions on their policy target. There are five channels of monetary transmission,
which include the exchange rate, assets effect, credit, expectation, and interest
rate channels. Which channel is the most important depends on the economy
under consideration, since the literature is inconclusive on the channel that is
most effective in transmitting monetary impulses.
Notwithstanding this, there is an upsurge interest in the interest rate channel
since most central banks across the globe use price-related anchor for conducting
monetary policy. Interest rate pass-through is generally defined as, the extent to
which either changes in central bank policy interest rates or money market inter-
est rates or both are reflected in changes in commercial banks’ interest rates, in
both the short-run and the long run. From the definition, there are two stages of
interest rate pass-through. The first stage describes how changes in the monetary
policy rate is transmitted to short and long term market rates, while the second
stage measures how changes in the market rates influence bank lending and de-
posit rates. Based on this, the literature distinguishes between the “cost of funds
approach” and “monetary policy approach” as two distinct stages of interest rate-
pass-through. Nonetheless, the second stage is largely influenced by the stability
of the yield curve, which makes it possible to take a shortcut by looking directly
at the relationship between policy rates and retail (deposit and loan) rates i.e.
focusing on how changes in policy rates affect retail interest rates.
The empirical literature on interest rate pass-through has grown enormously
with focus on both developed and developing economies. These studies have tried
to estimate the pass-through to identify the effectiveness of monetary policy. The
common aim shared by these studies include among others, identifying the channel
which is most effective for monetary policy by discovering the degree and speed of
adjustment of policy target to changes in policy rate.
The studies on monetary effectiveness can be categorized into country specific
or cross-country analysis. Cross-country analyses try to understand interest rate
transmission by relating possible variations to institutional framework or structural
breaks. In addition to examining the degree of adjustment of bank interest rate
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in response to changes in monetary policy rate, some studies also explored the
possibility of asymmetric adjustment in the market rates.
The empirical studies on pass-through differ from one another based on the
choice of policy rate proxy used, the econometric approach adopted and the time
coverage of the studies. Methodologically, Vector Auto-regression (VAR) modeling
technique has been the main approach adopted by researchers to estimates pass-
through (Cottarelli & Kourelis, 1994; Borio & Fritz, 1995; Cottarelli et al., 1995).
Recently however, studies are regularly based on Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag
(ARDL) model or on error correction model (Mojon, 2000; Aziakpono & Wilson,
2010; Samba & Yan, 2009). Irrespective of the approach used, the context and
time span, studies on pass-through concluded that
• The transmission of monetary impulses from policy rate to intermediate and
final targets are incomplete.
• There exists substantial heterogeneity in the pass-through mechanism across
countries and across bank products.
For example, Kwapil et al. (2009) found the long run pass-through to be lower
in the Euro area than the United States. Analyzing data from January 1995 to
September 2003 for various deposit and lending rates, they observed that most
categories of deposit rates were nearly complete (i.e. one-to-one) in the United
States whereas that of the Euro area range between 0.32 and 0.58. This means
that whiles policy change transmits proportionally to deposit rates in the United
States, only between 32 and 58 per cent transmit to deposit rates in the Euro
area. The long run pass-through to lending rates was also lower in the Euro area
compared to the United States ranging between 0.48 and 0.73. The findings of the
study show that whiles pass-through estimates are small, differences in magnitude
exist among countries.
Various factors have been identified to be responsible for pass-through hetero-
geneity among countries. Cross-country studies identified differences in macroeco-
nomic conditions and other country specific factors including financial structure,
banking competition, monetary policy regime, extent of money market develop-
ment and degree of development of the financial system among others as the cause
of differences in pass-through among countries. Gropp et al. (2014) investigated
the dynamics of pass-through between market interest rate and bank interest rate
in the Euro area as a function of cyclical and structural difference in the finan-
cial system using panel econometric approach including bank and market rates for
the individual Euro area countries. Their results show that the overall speed of
adjustment for loans is significantly faster than that of deposit, and as such, the
pass-through is especially sluggish for demand deposit and savings deposit. Bank
soundness, credit risk, and interest rate risk exert significant influence on the speed
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of pass-through. Exploring the possibility of asymmetry adjustment in the pass-
through process, the result suggests asymmetry in the pass-through process, as
banks tend to adjust loan rates quicker to changes in policy rates when rates are
going up than when they are going down- and vice versa for deposit rates.
The literature on pass-through in emerging economies seems to confirm re-
sults of incomplete pass-through in advanced economies. Samba and Yan (2009)
examined the monetary transmission mechanism in the countries of the Central
Africa Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) focusing on the interest
rates pass-through from short-term interest rates towards long-term rates. The
study employed an autoregressive distribute lag (ARDL) model in a panel setting
and found a very low and incomplete long run pass-through from the policy rate to
deposit rate. The study also found evidence of overshooting effect of lending rate
reaction to changes in the policy rate. The findings of this study conforms with
others such as Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) which found very low pass-through
signaling weak monetary transmission among developing countries.
The weak monetary policy identified among developing countries are attributed
to various institutional reasons. Mishra and Montiel (2013), took a stock of sys-
tematic evidence on the effectiveness of monetary transmission in developing coun-
tries to determine the extent a central bank action affects aggregate demand. In
the paper, they sought to determine whether the evidence of ineffective monetary
policy is based on methodological deficiencies. The study concluded that a wide
range of empirical approaches have failed to yield evidence of effective monetary
transmission in developing countries, and that the strongest evidence for effective
monetary transmission has arisen for relatively prosperous and more institution-
ally developed countries such as some central and Eastern European transition
economies (at least in the later stages of their transition).
From the literature surveyed thus far, we showed that interest rate pass-through
are sticky with evidences of cross-country differences and within country variations
over time. The differences in pass-through estimate are as result of the differences
that exist in the economic structure pertaining to a country’s financial system.
Although, the literature have showed that different financial market characteris-
tics1 do influence pass-through, the evidence that informal credit activities affect
pass-through rarely exist. The only notable study is by Ngalawa and Viegi (2013)2.
Ngalawa and Viegi (2013) investigated the interaction of formal and informal fi-
nancial markets and their impact on economic activity in quasi-emerging market
economies. Using a DSGE model, the study showed that interest rates in the
formal and informal financial sectors do not always change together in the same
1see for example Gropp et al. (2014).
2From the literature surveyed on determinant on pass-through and monetary transmission,
no study is found on informal credit activities on monetary effectiveness.
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direction to a response to policy. The study demonstrated that in some instances,
interest rates in the two sectors change in diametrically opposed directions with
the implication that the informal financial sector may frustrate monetary policy,
the extent of which depends on the size of the informal financial sector. Thus,
the larger the size of the informal financial sector the lower the likely impact of
monetary policy on economic activity. The findings from this study suggest that
informal credit activities may frustrate monetary transmission. However, from the
literature surveyed on determinant on pass-through and monetary transmission, no
study is found on informal credit activities on monetary effectiveness. Therefore,
this thesis contributes to the literature in this regards by empirically investigating
the effect of informal credit activities on monetary transmission.
In conclusion, the literature has identified several factors that could influence
interest rate pass-through. These factors are country specific that vary from coun-
try to country. The notable factors are associated with the financial environment
of the country, which changes overtime. One such financial development worth
investigating is the recent upsurge of informal credit intermediation in developing
economies. This thesis therefore investigates monetary effectiveness by identifying
the potential effect of informal credit intermediation on monetary effectiveness. In
the section that follows, the study presents the structure of the Ghanaian banking
system and its implication for the role of banks in monetary transmission.
1.3 The Structure of the Ghanaian Banking Sys-
tem and its Implication for the Role of Banks
in Monetary Transmission
Monetary policy effectiveness depends significantly on the idiosyncratic and insti-
tutional environment in which monetary policy is conducted. Paramount among
these features is the structure of the banking system which is pivotal in conducting
monetary policy. Therefore, in assessing the empirical effectiveness of monetary
policy in any country, it is important to comprehend the institutional environment
surrounding the implementation of monetary policy. To put the objective of this
study in perspective, this section briefly reviews the banking sector to show the
interrelations between the formal and informal financial sector.
1.3.1 The Structure of the Banking Industry
The central bank of Ghana categorizes the banking institutions into deposit taking
and non-deposit taking institutions. The deposit taking institution are financial
institutions that are allowed to both collect deposits in the form of savings from
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surplus spending agents and similarly advance credit facilities to deficit spending
agents in the economy. This category of institutions includes the universal banks
(commercial banks), non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), rural and commu-
nity banks (RCBs), and savings and loans companies, and some micro-finance
institutions.
The non-deposit taking institutions do not have the privilege to accumulate
deposit from surplus spending agents, rather they only provide financial services
that extends credit facilities to deficit spending agents in the economy. This in-
stitutional category includes the finance houses, leasing companies, forex bureau,
credit bureau and some micro-finance institution. Figure 1.1 shows the pictorial
representation of the structure of the financial sector of Ghana.
In Ghana, financial services are provided in a formal or informal ways. In
the formal way, financial services are provided through the universal (commercial)
banking activities. This categorizes the universal banking activities as the for-
mal sector. On the other hand, the micro-financing institutions provide financial
services informally in the economy, hence constituting the informal sector. The
micro-finance is further categorized into formal, semi-formal and informal. The
formal sector comprises of Rural Banks, Savings and Loan (S&L) companies and
Credit Unions. Rural Banks are public companies owned by communities (with
capitalization assistance from the BOG), registered and licensed as unit banks.
They, however, do not have branching privileges under the provisions of the Bank-
ing Law. Their operations are also limited to a well-defined geographical (rural)
area and are permitted to offer banking services limited to loans and to chequeing,
savings and time deposits.
The savings and loans Companies are registered and licensed under the NBFI
Law and are permitted to offer banking services limited to loans, savings and time
deposits and unlike the Rural Banks, they have branching privileges.
The informal sector is mainly made of money lenders and Susu collectors3. The
susu collectors provide safekeeping services for the savings collected and they are
not allowed to provide loan services from the money collected. However, clients
are able to access “loans” from their own Susu collectors in the form of "advance
draw-downs" against the total amount of savings they have contracted to deposit
weekly for a set period. In most cases, these advances have been made possible
by commercial and development banks, rural banks, and S&L companies with
3Susu means savings collection and is a system that offers products to help clients accumulate
their own savings over periods ranging from a month to two years. Susu is collected in the form
of clubs or cooperative scheme. The clubs are smaller units engaging in funds mobilization.
The cooperative susu collectors, through regulations have incorporated susu methodology into
formal financial institution. The co-operative association was formed and registered under co-
operative societies degree, 1968 (NLCD 252) with the name Ghana Cooperative Susu Collectors
Association (GCSCA)
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which the Susu collectors deposit the saving funds they collect and manage. The
Susu collectors help mobilize the savings for the clients and form an integral part
of the financial system in Ghana. Money-lenders, rotating savings and credit
associations (ROSCAs) and accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCAs)
also constitute the informal segment of the market for micro-finance in Ghana.
Figure 1.1: Structure of Financial Sector of Ghana
The banking industry has seen significant developments over the last few years.
Evolving from just three main banks at independence, the banking system as
at end of March 2016 comprised the Bank of Ghana, 29 Universal banks , 139
rural and community banks(RCBs), 61 NBFIs, and 555 MFIs. Table 1.1 shows
the developments of the respective banks between the period 2012 and 2018. As
evident from the table, the industry has witnessed phenomenal growth, and also
the emergence and significant growth of the micro-finance industry.
The industry has not only increased in the number of institution, but also in
total assets. Total assets of the industry at the end of March 2016, was GHc76.27
billion, up by 18.8% over the period of March 2015 level of GHc64.16 billion.
Within the period, total assets of the universal banks formed 84.7%, the NBFIs
held 10.1% while the RCBs took up 3.5% and MFIs 1.7% of the industry assets.
Table 1.2 and 1.3 shows the statistics.
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Table 1.1: Classification of the Banking Industry
Type 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Banks 29 27 27 27 27
NBFIs 61 57 57 52 50
RCBs 139 139 140 136 135
MFIs 555 337 135 - -
TOTALS 784 560 560 214 212
Source: Bank of Ghana database
Table 1.2: Asset Classification of the Banking Industry
Type 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
GHc’M GHc’M GHc’M GHc’M GHc’M
BANKs 64,556.76 55,087.22 39,128.47 27,996.11 22,935.56
NBFIs 7,722.92 5,803.23 4,236.20 2,768.55 1,914.19
RCBs 2,672.53 2,160.59 1,832.89 1,559.38 1,149.20
MFIs 1,316.19 1,113.87 342.47
TOTAL 76,268.39 64,164.91 45,520.24 32,324.04 25,998.96
Source: Bank of Ghana database
Table 1.3: Asset Share Classification of the Banking Industry
Type 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
BANKs 84.7 85.9 86.0 86.6 88.2
NBFIs 10.1 9.0 9.2 8.6 7.4
RCBs 3.5 3.4 4.0 4.8 4.4
MFIs 1.7 1.7 0.8
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Bank of Ghana database
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The composition and development in the assets of the banking industry signals
favorable inter and intra sector competitions. The increase in the number and
assets of banks signal some level of competition among banks. The degree of
market concentration as measured by assets of the top five banks has fallen steadily
overtime. Stanley (2008) found that market concentration declined from 77.6 per
cent in March 2000 to less than 55 percent and further to 45 percent in 2013. The
total advances held by the top five banks have also fallen. As shown in Figure
1.2, the total advances of the top five have declined marginally from 42.5 percent
in 2010 to 41.5 percent in 2013. Deposits, however, have increased from 46.7 per
cent to 48.2 per cent.
Figure 1.2: Asset Classification of Banks
Source: Compilation from 2014 Ghana Banking Survey by PriceWaterCoopers Inc.
Although competition in the banking sector has improved over the years, there
are several reasons to question the extent to which banks actually compete. While
bank concentration appears to be moderate by the sub-region’s standards, market
power still concentrates among few dominant banks. Competition between banks
in Ghana can be said to be very low, because more than 60 percent of the assets
of the banking sector are owned by at most four banks. In 2003, the three largest
commercial banks accounted for 55 percent of total assets of the banking sector.
By the year 2008, the dominant state-owned bank (GCB) enjoyed a substantial
market power, with 20 percent of total deposits and 44 percent of total branches -
a situation that may influence price setting among banks and distort competition.
This situation changed after the takeover of The Trust Bank (TTB) by Ecobank
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Table 1.4: Cross Market Analysis of Deposit and Loans of selected MFIs in Ghana
Year MFI Average Deposit per Loan per
Count Deposit Bal GNI per capita GNI per capita
2005 31 98 21.92 48.29
2006 33 119 22.75 52.91
2007 34 146 23.66 64.41
2008 32 116 15.93 48.3
2009 39 99 13.82 48.6
2010 30 112 6.97 22.03
2011 22 96 12.84 36.93
2012 10 151 9.76 2.68
2013 6 152 8.61 15.55
2014 7 68 4.2 3.94
Source: Micro-finance Information Exchange, Inc. Washington DC.
Ghana. However, the top five banks still hold about 45 percent of the industry’s
assets.
Empirical studies conducted on the level of competition in the banking sec-
tor confirm low level of competitions with the possible existence of monopolistic
behavior. Buchs and Mathisen (2005) found evidence of non-competitive market
structure in the Ghana banking system. This evidence was further confirmed by
Biekpe (2011). The study identified very high overhead cost and economic of scale
among the key factors which indirectly serves as barriers to entry, hence hampering
competition among banks.
Though banks compete marginally among themselves, recent trends as showed
in Table 1.2 and 1.3 indicate increasing competition between banks and non-bank
financial institutions. The increase in micro-finance institution in the country over
the years is reflected in the share of micro-finance loans in both the loan and
deposit market. From Table 1.3, the share of micro-finance loans and advances
as a percentage of total assets of banks and NBFI has been increasing. From a
percentage share of 4.8 per cent in 2008, the share of (NBFI, RCBs, & MFIs)
loans and advances have increased to 15.3 percent as the end March 2016. This
is also evident in the average increase in both deposit accounts and loans among
the MFIs. Table 1.4 shows the trend in deposit and loans for some selected MFIs.
As showed in the table, in 2005 about 31 MFIs held an average of USD98m in
deposit representing 21.92 per cent deposit per GNI per capita but only 7 MFIs
in 2014 held USD68m representing 4.2 per cent. Loan advance also shows similar
magnificent improvement. The above indicates that MFI intermediation is gaining
momentum in Ghana.
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The forgoing discussions reveal that the structure of the Ghanaian banking
industry signals both inter and intra sector competition. Intra competition among
banks is however, very low with few major banks holding unto the industry’s
assets. Also, the universal banks face some competition from the micro-finance
sector. The structural relationship and competition between formal and informal
banks may have some important implications for the conduct of monetary policy.
This, as a result, is the focus of this study.
1.3.2 Some Conjectures on the Role of Informal Banks in
Monetary Policy Transmission
The structure of the banking industry as espoused above is likely to determine the
response of banks interest pricing to monetary policy.
Relevant to the pricing decision of banks is competition. Intra-sector compe-
tition among banks engenders efficiency, causing banks to respond to monetary
signals from the central bank. This consequently leads to smooth monetary trans-
mission. From the descriptions in the above section, the development in the bank-
ing industry is likely to enhance competition. Hence, banks are likely to respond
favorably to monetary signals from the central bank, thereby enhancing monetary
transmission.
Even though competition in industry is required and good, given the different
regulatory environment the various institutions operate, inter-sector competition
is likely to affect the pricing decisions of the banking sector. As noted, the formal
banking sector operates under a legal framework different from that of the non-
banks and micro-finance institutions.
In the provisions of the Non-bank Financial Institutions Act, 2008 (Act 774)
and the Banking Act, 2004 (Act 673) as amended by Act 738, the universal banks
are required to keep reserves with central bank, whereas NBFI and MFIs are
not mandated to do so. Notwithstanding this, both universal banks and NBFIs
are deposit taking institutions, with no clear defined market segment for them.
Therefore, an inter-sector competition (i.e. competition between universal banks
and NBFIs in the deposit and loan market) has the tendency to influence how uni-
versal banks respond to monetary signals from the central bank. This is because,
when the central bank raises its policy rate, it does not affect informal interest rate
directly. Therefore, borrowers can switch credit demand to the informal banks in
response to higher interest rates in the formal system. The potential shift in credit
demand from formal bank to informal banks could cause retail interest rates in
the formal system to be less responsive to policy rate, consequently affecting the
interest rate transmission. How valid this assertion would be is the focus of the
first paper of the thesis.
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1.4 Conclusion
In view of the above discussion, it is found that the informal banking sector plays an
important role in the Ghanaian financial system. The sector, apart from increasing
in its size in credit intermediation process, it is interrelated with the formal banking
sector with evidence of inter-sector competition. As a result, the thesis produced
two papers to investigate informal credit activities in the Ghanaian economy. The
first paper explored the validity of the assertion that the presence of informal credit
intermediation could influence how retail interest pricing respond to monetary
signals. This followed from the discussion espoused in section 1.3.1 that signaled
that inter-sector competition between the formal and informal credit sectors could
influence monetary transmission.
The second paper investigated the effect of exogenous shocks on an economy
with informal credit activities. This is against the backdrop that most economic
turmoils emanates from credit intermediation. Hence, since informal credit inter-
mediation are gaining prominence in most economies, it is important to understand
how shocks behave in this scenario. This will guide and shape policy formulation
to mitigate potential future economic unrest.
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2Does Informal Credit Intermediation
Influence Monetary Policy? Some
Empirical Evidence for Ghana.
Abstract
Monetary transmission is found very weak in many developing economies. Identifying
the factors responsible for the weak transmission is important for an effective monetary
policy design. Thus, this study explored the factors that affect monetary transmission.
Particularly, it hypothesized that the growth of informal credit intermediation and it
linkages with the formal banking system could affect monetary transmission. This is be-
cause, informal banking does not fall directly under the regulatory framework for which
central banks conduct monetary policy. This notwithstanding, informal and formal
banks co-exist in the credit intermediation process. Therefore, this study used a Factor
Augmented Vector Auto-regression to investigate the determinants of pass-through in
Ghana. Particularly, the study explored the effect of informal banking on monetary
transmission. Using data sourced from the World Bank and Bank of Ghana databases,
the study found that monetary pass-through is very weak in Ghana. The study found
that factors such as non-performing loans, excess liquidity and the level of financial
development influence pass-through. Also, informal banking is found to affect transmis-
sion, however the effect is minimal. Informal banking reduces pass-through estimates
from 0.033 to 0.024.
Keywords: Interest Rate Pass-through, Informal Credit Intermediation and Ghana
JEL Classification: E52, E54, G210
2.1 Introduction
The Ghanaian financial sector has undergone gradual reforms since the intro-duction of the Financial Sector Adjustment Program1 (FINSAP) in 1988.
1 FINSAP is the financial sector reform component of the broad Economic Recovery Program
introduced in the country between 1983 and 1986 to restructure the economy to path of economic
growth. The reform introduced a market based approach in economic management thereby
replacing the hitherto control system which had characterized the economy.
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Pre-reform banking sector, as noted by Gockel et al. (1997), was characterized by
a low capital base, weak management and accounting information, and inadequate
legal and regulatory framework. These challenges engendered the financial sector
reforms in 1988 which resulted in the introduction of new banking law 2 of 1989.
The reform involved among others: the liberalization and deregulation of the fi-
nancial sector, development of capital and security market, and the promotion of
non-bank financial institutions.
The financial system, in the aftermath program, witnessed enormous growth
and structural transformation. Credit intermediation also increased. Notwith-
standing these developments in the financial sector, the financial coverage was
very limited leaving vast of the Ghanaian populace un-banked3. This was preva-
lent among the informal traders and individuals who could not access financial
services from the formal banks4. The concomitant effect was the emergence of
informal institutions to address the needs of the un-banked.
Over the years, the informal sector5 has grown considerably in Ghana and in
many other countries. For example, the IMF Financial Stability Board (2014)
report estimated the size of the global shadow banking system to be about 40
percent of the total financial system. Although data is sparse, anecdotal evidence
suggest a similar trend in Ghana. For example, the amount of loans extended by
Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) increased from GHc70.63 million in 2003
to GHc72.85 million in 2004, suggesting 3.1 percent growth. In 2006, a total of
GHc160.47 million was extended to clients, which represents 48.8 percent higher
than the previous year’s total loans and advances granted by these micro-finance
institutions. The upward-trend of NBFI’s credits to individuals, small businesses,
groups and others indicate marked improvements in the level of micro-finance and
the gradual growth in total financial assets in the country. Overall, figures from
2 This new law was to govern the establishment and operation of the banking sector. Also, it
stipulated how to conduct monetary policy giving rise to monetary targeting framework.
3As at 2014, the total population of Ghanaian above 15 years that bank with a financial
institution stood at 34.618 percent. The proportion of the poor increased from 16.66 percent in
2011 to 24.35 2014. This proportion is very low especially amidst the huge development in the
financial sector that has witnessed a significant increase in both the total number of universal
banks and non-bank institutions alike.
4 Most formal banks were not willing to extend credit to these categories because they are
perceived as high risk.
5For the purpose of this study and in consonant with the data used for this study, we follow
Bank of Ghana distinction where financial services are provided formally via the universal banks
and informally via micro-financing. As a result, formal banks in this study represent universal
banks that operate under the required reserve regulatory of the Bank of Ghana, whiles informal
banks consist of the Non-Bank Financial Institution (NBFI), the RCBs, and Micro-Finance
Institution (MFI) that do not operate under required reserve regulatory framework of BoG. The
share of NBFI& MFI credits in total bank credit is used as the proxy which captures the presence
of informal credit intermediation.
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Bank of Ghana indicate that the share of micro-finance loans and advances as a
percentage of total assets of banks and NBFI loans and advances has increased
from 4.8 percent in 2008 to 9.8 percent in 2013.
The banking sector plays a pivotal role in the conduct of monetary policy. It
performs this role by transmitting monetary impulses to the real sector by inter-
mediating between borrowers and depositors. This is achieved through the banks’
regulatory relationship with the central bank,which enables monetary authorities
to influence the pricing decisions of banks, and subsequently influence credit de-
mand and supply conditions to achieve desired outcome on the economy. The
banking sector however, as noted above6, has overtime evolved to include both
formal and informal banks. These two types of banks however, are related with
the central bank on different regulatory environment. Whiles the formal banks
(universal banks) are mandated by law to keep reserves7 with the central bank,
the informal banks are not. Notwithstanding the different regulatory environment
the two types of banks operate, their activities are linked in the intermediation
process. This distinct relationship with the central bank causes the central bank
to have direct influence on the pricing decision of formal banks but not that of
informal banks. This may have some implications for monetary transmission. For
instance, when the central bank raises its policy rate, it does not affect informal
interest rate directly. Borrowers thus can switch credit demand to the informal
banks in response to higher interest rates in the formal system. The potential
shift in credit demand from formal bank to informal banks could cause retail in-
terest rates in the formal system to be less responsive to policy rate, consequently
affecting the interest rate transmission.
Although the literature provides evidence on the role of formal banks in trans-
mitting monetary impulses to the real sector, the evidence on the role of informal
banks is largely absent. Notwithstanding this, informal banking activities have
been increasing over the past decades. As a result, this study fills the gap in
the literature by exploring the potential effect of informal banking activities on
monetary transmission.
The novelty of this study is twofold. Foremost, it is the first study to empirically
investigate the role of informal credit intermediation on monetary transmission
process8. Secondly, the study provides evidence on the possible role that informal
banking activities plays in the monetary transmission process. Thus, it will help
to shape monetary design and regulation design of the formal and informal banks.
Using a factor augmented vector autoregressive approach with interaction terms,
6See section 1.3.1 of Chapter 1 for the description of the Ghanaian banking sector.
7The reserve requirement is regulatory tool the central bank uses to affect the banking system,
and, ultimately, the economy by influencing the proportion of total assets that depositories hold
as cash assets (either vault cash or balances with the central bank).
8This is supported by the literature surveyed so far.
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the study found that monetary transmission is very weak in Ghana with very low
estimated long-run pass-through. Also, the study identified factors such as non-
performing loans, excess liquidity and the level of financial development to hinder
smooth monetary transmission. Further, the study found that informal credit in-
termediation influence pass-through marginally. Informal activities is estimated
to decrease pass-through estimates from 0.033 to 0.024.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 reviews brief theoret-
ical and empirical literature, whiles section 2.3 describes the econometric approach
used for the analysis. Section 2.4 presents and discusses the results, and section
2.5 summarizes the work and provides some policy recommendations.
2.2 Theoretical Background
This study investigates the role of informal finance on monetary transmission by
assessing the effect of informal banking on bank’s interest rate response to mone-
tary policy shock. This is captured by the impact informal finance has on interest
rate pass-through (IRPT). Theoretically, the analyses of IRPT in the literature
are generally based on the marginal cost pricing model. This model relates the
retail interest rate as a mark-up of the marginal cost which may be represented
by the policy rate (Borio & Fritz, 1995; G. De Bondt, 2002).
There are various theories that explain banks’ lending decisions, which result in
the derivation of marginal cost pricing. These theories are separated based on the
assumption about the market structure- whether perfect or imperfect competition.
In models of perfect competition, firms are price takers and are unable to change
their prices hence equilibrium is achieved when price equal marginal cost. In
imperfect markets, firms have the market power to change their own prices. The
appropriateness of any particular model depends on the structure of the market
under consideration. The typical derivation of the mark-up equation determines
its component, which ultimately determines the pass-through. In the section that
follows, the study presented the derivation of the marginal cost pricing which
incorporates the objective of the studies. This follows the standard theory of bank’s
pricing decision, where banks are confronted by agents who demand both formal
and informal credits. The resulting equation establishes a relationship between
interest rate and monetary policy instrument where the elasticity of substitution
between formal and informal credit determines the pass-through.
2.2.1 The Model
A monopolistic competitive banking industry capable of changing retail prices is
assumed. The banking sector consists of a formal bank and an informal bank
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that provide varieties of credit facilities to households. As a result, the aggregate
credit demand is given by a composite CES basket of slightly differentiated prod-
ucts which are each supplied by formal bank and informal bank. To capture the
market power that characterize the banking industry, the credit market is treated
analogously as the standard Dixit-Stieglitz framework for the goods market, in
which each agent demands loan contract from each single financial institution (i.e.
formal and informal) in order to borrow one unit of resources. The aggregate loan
demand by an agent is expressed as
Bt =
α 1Bft −1 + (1− α) 1BIt −1
 −1 , (2.1)
where α is the share of agent loan obtained from the formal sector, Bft and BIt are
the credit demand from the formal and informal bank respectively, and  is the
elasticity of substitution between the formal and informal credit. The elasticity
of substitution captures the level of competition between formal and informal
credit in the agents’ basket of credit demand. An elasticity of one shows perfect
substitution. The degree of elasticity indicates the willingness of an agent to trade
formal credit with informal credit. The agents’ aim is to choose credit bundles
that minimize total loan payment. If rft and rIt are the interest rate facing agents
from formal and informal bank respectively, then the optimizing condition results
in the following demands for credit
Bft = αBi
rft
rt
−, (2.2)
BIt = (1− α)Bi
rIt
rt
−, (2.3)
where rt is the aggregate interest rate facing the agent.
The formal bank engages in the production of deposit and loan services with a
given technology represented by a cost function C. The cost function satisfies the
usual assumptions of convexity. Taking into account the management cost, the
formal bank maximizes its profit subject to the loan demand schedule. Formally,
Max
{rf,t}
rft Bft −RtBft − Ct
, (2.4)
subject to equation 2.2. Rt is the inter-bank or wholesale interest rate. The cost
function C is assumed to follow a quadratic function of the form
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Ct =
κ
2
(
rft
rft−1
− 1
)2
rft B
f
t , (2.5)
where κ is the adjustment cost, which indicates the cost the bank incurs in an
attempt to change retail price (i.e. interest rate). Solving the bank’s problem
result in the FOC that stipulates the loan pricing equation for the formal bank.
The pricing equation is given as
1− + Rt
rft
− κ
(
rft
rft−1
− 1
)
rft
rft−1
+ ∆t = 0, (2.6)
where the ∆t represents the expectation component of the equation. The Log-
linear version of the pricing equation is given as
r̂t
f = κ
t − 1 + (1 +Qp)κr̂t−1
f + Qpκ
− 1 + (1 +Qp)κEtr̂t+1
f + − 1
− 1 + (1 +Qp)κR̂t,
(2.7)
where Qp is the discount factor the bank attached to its streams of profits. The
equation indicates that banks set their loan rates by taking into account the policy
rate, which is the relevant marginal cost. The interest rate pass-through is given
by
IRPT = dr
dR
= − 1
− 1 + (1 +Qp)κ. (2.8)
Equation shows that the pass-through depends on the elasticity of substitution
between formal and informal loans , banks discount factor Qp and the cost of
changing interest rate κ. If  = 1, implying that informal credits are perfect
substitute to formal credits in the agents’ credit demand basket, then
IRPT = dr
dR
= 0 (2.9)
From the above, it is showed that monetary effectiveness depends on the degree
of substitution of informal and formal credit in an agent’s credit basket. That is,
the presence of informal credit and its degree of substitution to formal credits
influence the effectiveness of monetary policy. Based on this, it is hypothesized in
this study that the growth in informal intermediation in most developing economies
raises concern for effective monetary policy implementation. This is because, high
informal financing serves as an alternative to formal credit financing. The presence
of this alternative curtails the ability of banks to change their rates in response to
changes in the policy rate. This has potential effects on the transmission process
consequently affecting the effectiveness of monetary policy. Therefore, the role of
informal finance in monetary transmission process can be captured by the impact
it has on interest rate pass-through.
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2.2.2 Determinants of Pass-through
Apart from informal credit, which is hypothesized in this study to influence retail
pricing decisions of commercial banks, hence interest rate pass-through, the lit-
erature identifies various factors that influence interest rate pass-through. These
factors are captured theoretically by the market power and elasticity that affect
the pricing decision of banks. Though, studies such as Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal
and Howells (2002) and Espinosa-Vega et al. (2004) emphasized the availability of
alternative instrument (i.e. substitutes) as the key determinant of banks’ pricing
behavior, others like Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2010) and G. De Bondt (2002),
G. J. De Bondt (2005) noted the role of elasticity in the pass-through process.
These factors are however mutually reinforcing. For example, the existence of
substitutes directly affects the demand elasticity of a product and this elasticity
increases with the degree of substitutability. Hence, the availability of substitutes
increases elasticity and competition while reducing banks’ market power. As noted
by Hannan and Berger (1991), the lack of market contestability and a high degree
of financial market underdevelopment limit the substitute for money and credit
thereby affecting their respective elasticity and the overall monetary policy pass-
through. The foregoing discussion thus suggests that determinants of interest rate
pass-through are identified by factors that influence banks mark ups and elasticity.
These mainly include the economy’s financial structure, which sets the right
incentives for banks to pass on policy rate changes to customers. For instance, a
market power which explains interest rate adjustment behavior of banks depends
on the opportunity cost of making such adjustment. Banks would only adjust
(i.e. transmit changes to its customers) if the associated opportunity cost is less
than the gain. Consequently, the existence of opportunity cost would increase the
stickiness of bank’s retail rates (Berger & Udell, 1992; Alien & Gale, 2004; Kwapil
et al., 2006).
However, other structural characteristics such as an economy’s overall regula-
tory environment can also influence an effective interest rate transmission (Mishra
et al., 2012; Mishra & Montiel, 2013). These potential constraints to effective
interest rate transmission process are thus described below.
• Liquidity Ratio: Changes in policy rate have limited influence on the credit
supply in the presence of high excess liquidity. This subsequently does not
cause changes in retail lending rates. Therefore, interest rate transmission
may be less effective in a financial market with abundant liquidity. This
is because the liquidity serves as a buffer against market fluctuations and
monetary shocks. Excess liquidity results from a lack of adequate investment
opportunities.
• Asset Quality: The presence of bad loans which translate into weak bal-
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ance sheet restrict banks to react to expansive monetary policy. Rather than
increasing credits, banks shore up liquidity. In this regard, retail interest rate
becomes less responsive to policy shock.
• Financial Development: The structure of the financial market and the
level of development are identified to affect pass-through (Hannan & Berger,
1991; Borio & Fritz, 1995; Ozdemir, 2009; Gigineishvili, 2011). According to
Hannan and Berger (1991) and Ozdemir (2009), more developed markets are
expected to have a variety of financial products and derivatives so that there
is increased substitutability and higher competition among various sources
and/or uses of funds. As a result, the degree of financial development should
relate directly with the degree of pass-through. This has been confirmed by
studies such as (Sander & Kleimeier, 2004; Gropp et al., 2014).
• Banking Sector Competition: Market contestability and inter-industry
and intra-industry competition have an effect on pass-through. Competition
results in diversified financial instruments. This creates an available sub-
stitute for money and credit thereby affecting respective elasticity and the
overall transmission process.
• Regulatory Environment: Poor regulatory environment is identified to
influence monetary transmission. This is because a poorly functioning regu-
latory environment creates uncertainty in the financial system, which leads
to de-formalization of financial transactions and a higher cost of financial
intermediation. Mishra et al. (2012) related the small size of financial in-
termediation in many developing economies to a weak regulatory environ-
ment. The concomitant effect is that bank rates may become less sensitive
to changes in the policy rate.
In conclusion, monetary effectiveness depends on the degree of interest rate
pass-through. This however, depends largely on the elasticity, and inter and intra
competition among financial intermediaries in the financial industry at large.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
The study used Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) approach to
estimate the pass-through and evaluate its determinants. Vector Auto-Regression
(VAR) and Auto-Regression Distributed Lag (ARDL) modeling approach are the
main techniques used in the literature to estimate pass-through. The appropriate
technique depends on the data structure under consideration. Following the data
structure used, this study used the VAR approach.
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Though the VAR approach generates empirical plausible assessments of the
dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables to monetary policy innovations, it
does not lack criticism. The standard VAR approach addresses the effect of unan-
ticipated changes in monetary policy by identifying monetary policy innovation.
Different identifications lead to different inferences about the shape and timing
of the responses of economic variables. However, there is no consensus among
researchers on the appropriate identification strategy to ascertain exogenous effect
to monetary shocks9.
Also, the VAR approach is more efficient with endogenous variables not ex-
ceeding four. VAR models with large (i.e. greater than four) endogenous variables
result in a degree of freedom problem. However, using only a small variables in
the VAR to investigate monetary impulses does not capture fully the large range
of factors considered in monetary policy decisions. This has a potential adverse
effect on the results. The "price puzzle"10 is a known example derived from VAR
models with limited information.
In practice, monetary policy decisions are conditioned on a large information
set. Similarly, apart from the policy rate, there are range of conditions such as
risk perception, liquidity, and economic conditions that influence interest rates.
All these factors, however, cannot be accommodated in a standard VAR modeling.
To overcome this, the study adopted the FAVAR approach. FAVAR models are
shown as useful to resolve the information set problem by making it possible to
practically summarize and observe a large number of time series information using
a comparatively small number of factors (Stock & Watson, 2002; Bernanke &
Boivin, 2003; Bernanke et al., 2005).
2.3.1 Modeling Approach
FAVAR is a generalized VAR that models the dynamic interaction among eco-
nomic observable variables and factor scores generated from a factor analysis. The
modeling strategy used to identify the determinants of pass-through followed the
approach described in Towbin and Weber (2013). In the approach by Towbin and
Weber (2013), the dynamic interactions among the economic variables are allowed
to vary deterministically with potential factors that may influence pass-through.
The FAVAR model is specified as joint dynamic of (Ft, Yt) that is defined by a
9Refer to Christiano et al., (2000) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) for the survey of some
identification alternatives.
10 A fundamental tenet of monetary policy making is that an increase in the short-term
interest rate will lower price inflation. Contrary, empirical estimates of the relationship between
the policy rate and inflation have suggested that an interest rate hike is followed immediately by
a sustained increase in the inflation rate. This result has become known in the literature as the
“price puzzle,”
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transition equation given by FtYt
 = ω(l) Ft−1Yt−1
+ vt (2.10)
where vt is a vector of noise. Yt is an Mx1 vector of observable economic variables
which are assumed to influence retail rates. For this study, the set Yt includes the
policy rate and retail lending rates. ω(L) is a conformable lag polynomials of finite
order d.
Equation 2.10 is a VAR in (Ft, Yt). The equation reduces to unrestricted VAR,
a structural VAR, or some other multivariate time series when the terms of ω(L)
that relate Yt to Ft−1 are all zero. That is, equation 2.10 reduces to VAR when
only Yt is used. However, estimating the VAR using only Yt may result in an
omitted variable bias that may influence the estimates. This is because, Yt may not
capture exhaustively all the relevant economic information that may explain the
dynamics in the model. For example, loan pricing policy includes factors such as
credit market and other macroeconomic conditions that may not be appropriately
captured by Yt.
To circumvent the potential omitted variable effect on the estimations, equa-
tion 2.10 incorporates additional information set to the VAR through a vector of
unobserved factors Ft. Ft is a Kx1 unobserved factors that captures fluctuations
in retail rates or reflects a theoretically motivated concept such as credit conditions
that cannot be easily represented by one or two series but rather are reflected in
a wide range of economic variables.
Given that Ft is unobserved, equation 2.10 cannot be estimated directly. How-
ever, suppose there exist a set of N time series denoted by Zt, such that N may
be greater than the number of time periods T , then it can be assumed that the
number of factors and observed variables in the FAVAR system are greater than
N (i.e. K +M > N,). If the time series Zt are related to the unobserved factor Ft
and sometimes, but not always- the observable Yt, then a relational equation can
be specified as
Zt = BfFt +ByYt + t, (2.11)
where Bf and By are factor loading of NxK and NxM dimensions that conforms
to Zt, Ft, and Yt, while t is the vector ofNx1 idiosyncratic noise that are weakly
serially and cross-sectional correlated with mean zero11. If the factor model is
11Note that both Yt and Ft, which in general can be correlated, represent common forces that
drive the dynamics of Zt. As a result, Zt are noisy measures of the underlying unobserved factors
Ft which makes it depends not only on the current values but also lagged values of the factors.
However, as noted by Stock and Watson [2002], the principal component estimation allows for
some cross-correlation in t that must vanish as N goes to infinity.
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expressed without an inclusion of the observable variable Yt, then the static relation
is specified as
Zt = BFt + t (2.12)
In a dynamic factor, the factor Ft are related over time, typically according to a
linear process as
Zt = A(l)BFt + t, (2.13)
where A(l) denotes a polynomial in the lag operator.
Following Stock and Watson (1998, 1999), the factors Zt and Ft in the dynamic
factor model is estimated using the principal component technique. As discussed
in Stock and Watson (1998, 1999), this method is numerically robust and compu-
tationally efficient, and is econometrically consistent for the latent factor Ft under
standard technical conditions.
To estimate the pass-through coefficients, the lending rate is modeled as a
function of its own regressors and the lag of the policy rate as well as factors. The
model is given as
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δ1pq = α1pq + θ1pqXt (2.15)
it is the policy rate, rt is the retail rate and ft is the factor loadings that
capture other variables that potentially influence retail pricing. The variables
used for such purpose included inflation, exchange rate, interbank lending rate
and treasury bill rates. Following equation 2.15 , the estimated pass-through
coefficients are further regressed on Xt (which captures potential determinants of
interest rate pass-through). The impulse response functions are estimated using
the Cholesky ordering where policy rates are assumed to be unaffected by changes
in retail rates and the factors.
2.3.2 Data
The study used two data-sets: one sampled at the monthly frequency and the
other on an annual frequency. A sample of 106 data points sampled over the pe-
riod 2005 to 2013 was used for the analysis. The key variables used for the analysis
are the policy rate and the retail lending rate. As per the study’s objective another
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Table 2.1: Data Description
Variable Frequency Proxy Source
Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) Monthly Policy Rate BoG
Commercial Base Rate (BR) Monthly Retail lending Rate BoG
Non-Performing Loans (NPLR) Annual Asset Quality WDI
Liquidity Reserve (LR) Annual Liquidity Ratio WDI
Private Credit to GDP (DCP) Annual Financial Development WDI
Share of MFI & NBF loans Annual Informal intermediation BoG
to Total Bank & NBFI loans (NBLR)
GDP Annual WDI
important variable used is the Share of micro-finance and non-bank loans to the to-
tal bank & non-bank loans (hereafter NBLR). This ratio captures the proportion
of informal credit intermediation in total credit intermediation hence represent-
ing the effect of informal activities in the credit market. In addition, the study
included theoretically identified variables that influence pass-through estimates.
These variables include private credit to GDP, liquidity ratio and non-performing
loan which are used as proxies for financial development, liquidity reserves and as-
set quality respectively. The study sourced data from Bank of Ghana and World
Bank databases. The interest rate variables are sourced at monthly frequency
while the structural characteristics are sourced at annual frequency since they are
not available at a higher frequency (i.e. monthly frequency). However, the annual
data were linearly interpolated to monthly frequency 12. We acknowledge that,
though the interpolation could have some potential influence on the estimates,
we guide against this by ensuring that the variance in the data structure is mini-
mized, and also, the time series properties of the data is not immensely affected.
The description of the data is further explained in Table 2.1:
2.4 Results and Discussion
2.4.1 Results
The study began by subjecting the series to a unit root test. The rationale is to
avoid any spurious regression. Amidst the numerous test procedures, the study
12Saborowski and Weber (2013) interpolated lower frequency data for similar analysis. Also,
the World Development Indicator (WDI) data by the World Bank is often interpolated to fill the
data gap for countries whose data are not available at the required frequency. The interpolation
were conducted gauging against any distortion that will affect the time series properties of the
data.
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Table 2.2: Unit Root Test
Variable Level First Difference
Base Rate −1.3865 −5.2172
[0.5858] [0.000]∗∗∗
MPR −1.6899 −5.0791
[0.7482] [0.000]∗∗∗
P-values are reported in the parenthesis [ ]. (***) indicates rejection of unit root
at 1% level
relied on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller(ADF) test procedure. The ADF test suffers
from two caveats: (1) the inclusion of additional deterministic components in the
regression model used for testing the presence of unit roots results in an increased
probability that the null hypothesis of non-stationary will be accepted when in fact
the true data generating process is stationary. (2) The presence of unnecessary
nuisance parameters (constant and trend terms) has the effect of lowering the
power of the test against stationary alternatives. As a result, the study adopted
the sequential testing procedure suggested by Peron (1988). The number of lags
introduced in the ADF regression was chosen considering the general to specific
procedure suggested by Hall (1994). The results of the ADF unit root test for
the main variables are presented in Table 2.2. The results indicate that all the
variables are non-stationary at level and integrated of order one I (1).
In the literature on interest rate pass-through, the appropriateness of the VAR
approach depends on the feedback from policy rate to movements in the lending
rate. Based on this, the study presents in Table 2.3 a causality test to ascertain
the direction of causality. The test results suggest that the lags of the lending
rate are jointly significant in the entire variety of model specifications supporting
bi-causality and thus favoring the VAR approach.
Table 2.3: Granger Causality Test
Chi-square P-Value
Retail Rate
Policy Rate 32.4628 0.000∗∗∗
Policy Rate
Retail Rate 7.4933 0.023∗∗
*** (**) indicate rejection of null hypothesis of no causality at 1% and 5% respec-
tively
A preliminary correlation analysis is presented to show the initial behavior
29
of the variables. Figure 2.1 shows the plot of the policy rate and retail lending
rate. The graph shows some variations indicating that the policy rate has been
changing over the period in response to the dynamics of the economy. Again, the
graph shows that policy rate and lending move in tandem.
Figure 2.1: The Graph of Lending and Policy Rates between 2005 and 2014
The covariance analysis results as presented in Table 2.4 indicates that the
retail rate reacts to policy rate. The correlation coefficient is estimated to be
about 60 percent and significant suggesting a positive relation between the policy
rate and interest rate. The study further decomposed the policy rate change into
positive and negative changes representing an increase and decrease in policy rate
respectively. The correlation results for the decomposition showed that the corre-
lation between interest rate and positive policy rate change is greater than that
of a negative change. Also, the correlation with a positive change is statistically
significant while that of a negative change is insignificant. This shows that policy
rate only contributes to an increase in interest rate but not a decrease. Hence,
this provides an indication to support the case that interest rates are rigid down-
wards in Ghana and that, monetary authorities cannot reduce the high interest
rates with policy rate. The section that follows presents the formal econometric
analysis.
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Table 2.4: A Covariance Analysis Results between the policy rate and the lending
rate
Policy Rate Retail Lending Rate
Default Covariance 4.1645
Correlation 0.5981
P-value 0.0000***
Negative change Covariance -0.1567
Correlation -0.0135
P-value 0.8953
Positive change Covariance 4.3212
Correlation 0.3557
P-value 0.0003***
2.4.2 Estimating the Pass-through
To ascertain the pass-through estimates, the study first estimated the simple VAR
model without factor. Using lag length of two13, the VAR was estimated to gen-
erate an impulse response function identified by assuming that policy rate is con-
temporaneously unaffected by changes in retail lending rate 14
Figure 2.2 shows the impulse response function to one standard deviation shock
with 95 percent confidence bandwidth drawn around the point estimates. The long
pass-through is estimated at 0.035 and this is presented in Figure 2.2. As Figure
2.2 illustrates, monetary shock does not affect the lending rate at the initial stage
(i.e. between the first and second month of perturbation). The full long-run pass-
through materializes after about the fifteen months (approximately four quarters)
with about 90 per cent of the estimates materializing after twelve months (i.e. a
year).
The estimated long-run pass-through suggests incomplete pass-through. This
incomplete pass-through is consistent with other empirical studies that focused on
developing economies15. However, the estimate is far below the estimated values
for countries that share similar characteristics with Ghana. The low estimate of
long-run pass-through gives indications that the central bank of Ghana has weak
13The optimal lag length of two was chosen based on the Akaike and Schwartz information
criteria.
14 The study also experimented with the Cholesky ordering assuming that the retail lending
rate is contemporaneously unaffected by policy rate. This was conducted to check if identification
is a problem. The estimates however, did not show any significant difference.
15 See for example; (Wu et al., 2007; Chandan et al., 2005) for Mauritius, and (Samba & Yan,
2009) for Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community. Mishra and Montiel (2013) used
a sample of 94 countries and find that the correlation between policy rates and lending rates in
the long term is 0.35 for advanced economies, 0.61 for emerging economies and 0.29 for LDCs.
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influence on the retail pricing of commercial banks.
Figure 2.2: IRF of Lending Rate to Policy Rate
Again, the pass-through is estimated using the FAVAR modeling technique.
This is because, aside the policy rate, the literature identifies a range of deter-
minants of interest rate. However, as explained in section 2.3.1, the consistency
of the VAR estimates beyond some required variables becomes questionable and
not implementable. Hence, to prevent the problem of omitted variable bias which
might influence the pass-through estimates, the factor approach is adopted. The
approach follows two stages. First, estimate the factor from potential determinants
of interest rate using factor analysis. In this regard, factor scores were derived from
inflation rate, treasury bill rate, exchange rate and inter-bank lending rate.The fac-
tor score together with the policy rate is used to estimate a VAR model both with
and without interaction terms from factor and policy rate to determine the average
pass-through.
Figure 2.3 shows the impulse response function generated from the FAVAR
model. A qualitative inspection of figure 2.2 and 2.3 suggests that the estimated
pass-through from the FAVAR model is not different from that of the VAR model.
This may suggest that the impact of a potential omitted variable bias in the
model without the factor will probably be minimal. Hence, proceeding even with
the model without the factor will not produce any bias analysis. However, the
study proceeded with the factor approach.
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Figure 2.3: IRF of Lending Rate to Policy Rate for the factor model
2.4.3 Determinants of Pass-through
To identify the pass-through determinants, the model in Equations 2.14 is esti-
mated by adding to the set Xt, one at a time, the economic characteristics assumed
to influence the pass-through. By this specification, the conditional coefficients es-
timates imply that the retail rate is not only a function of its own lags and the
policy rate, but also, it includes the interaction terms between all these regressors
and the structural characteristic in set Xt. Thus, the transmission from the policy
rate to the lending rate is a function of the structural characteristics in Xt.
To assess the impact of thees characteristics on the pass-through estimates, the
study contrasts the impulse response function generated from the simple model
without the structural characteristics with that of the model with the structural
characteristic. The IRF is then evaluated to identify whether the pass-through
increases, decreases or remains unchanged with the introduction of the structural
characteristic. Table 2.5 presents the pass-through estimates for the various mod-
els.
To ascertain the overall effect of the structural characteristics on the pass-
through, we estimated the unrestricted (full) model in equation 2.14. Figure 2.4
is the IRF generated from the FAVAR estimation with all the structural charac-
teristics in set Xt. The IRF presents both the point estimates and 95 per cent
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Table 2.5: Pass-through Estimation Results
variable Estimated PT *Change in PT
Restricted VAR 0.035 -
Restricted FAVAR 0.033 -
Unrestricted FAVAR with
All determinants 0.012 0.021
Informal Credit 0.024 0.009
Financial Development 0.022 0.011
Liquidity Ratio 0.030 0.003
* The change in PT is in respect with deviation from the PT estimate from the
Restricted FAVAR
confidence intervals around them. Contrasting the IRFs in figures 2.3 and 2.4
shows that, the pass-through estimate is lower in the unrestricted model (model
estimated with all the potential determinants) compared with the fully-restricted
model (model with only policy rate as a regressor). Figure 2.4 revealed that the
Figure 2.4: IRF: Variations with all Determinanta
a The figure to the left is the IRF generated for the fully restricted model while the
right-hand figure is the IRF of the fully unrestricted model
long run pass-through reduces by 0.021 from 0.033 to 0.012 when the full model is
estimated. Further, the figures revealed that whereas it takes approximately fif-
teen months for the long run estimates to fully materialize in the restricted model
(figure 2.3), it takes only about five months for the unrestricted model (figure
2.4). This suggests that the pass-through is weakened by the presence of these
characteristics. The assessment of the individual characteristics as suggested by
the results is thus espoused below:
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Informal Credit Intermediation
The main objective of this study is to investigate informal credit activities as a
potential determinant of the pass-through. Following the theoretical background
developed above, we assumed that the elasticity between formal and informal credit
affects the interest rate pass-through. The elasticity captures the rivalry between
formal and informal credit in the consumer’s credit basket. That is, informal credit
serving as an alternative to formal credits, creates real or potential competition
between MFI’s and universal banks. This real or potential competition restricts
universal banks to respond to policy rate changes.This is because, rather than
passing on the full burden of cost (increase in policy rate) to customers in the
form of higher retail prices, commercial banks accommodate proportional amount
due to the fear that consumer will shift to MFI’s who provide similar services.
By means of this, informal credit intermediation reduces pass-through estimates.
The share of MFI & NBF loans to Total Bank & NBFI loans (NBLR) is used to
capture the rivalry between the types of credit facing the consumer
Figure 2.5 presents the IRF contrasting the fully restricted model to an unre-
stricted model with proxy for informal credit intermediation as the only structural
characteristic in set Xt. As showed in figure 2.5, informal credit intermediation
reduces long-run pass-through estimates from 0.033 to 0.024. This gives an indi-
cation that the presence of informal credit could restrict commercial banks to fully
pass on policy shock to retail prices.
It is worth noting that the above result is plausible for a policy rate increase.
On the contrary, a decrease policy rate might not have the same effect. This is
because, when policy rate decreases, commercial banks can decrease the lending
rate to gain a competitive advantage over MFIs since they have access to extra
funds from the central bank. By implication, a policy rate decrease should result
in higher pass-through than a policy rate increase.
To investigate this asymmetry, the study decomposed the policy rate into pos-
itive change and negative change representing increase and decrease in policy rate
respectively. The study then estimated the pass-through for each change and ana-
lyzed the effect of informal intermediation on the respective pass-through estimate.
Figure 2.6 presents the IRF for the asymmetry model.
The study estimated the pass-through to be 0.024 and 0.021 respectively for
a positive change and negative change. The generated IRFs revealed that, for a
positive policy rate change, informal credit intermediation reduces pass-through
by 0.011. However, for a negative policy rate change, informal intermediation
reduce pass-through by 0.003. This finding is in contrast to the expectation that
the presence of informal intermediation should cause pass-through to change by
greater margin for a negative change than a positive change since formal banks
with competitive advantage would like to explore the negative policy change to
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their advantage. However, this is not surprising because, the exploratory analysis
in Table 2.4 showed that while there exist a significant correlation between interest
rate and positive policy change, there is no significant correlation between interest
rate and negative policy rate change. The reason mainly could be because the
profits of commercial banks depend mainly on interest income 16. As a result,
banks easily increase the retail rate when policy rate increases but are reluctant
to decrease them in order not to cut down on interest income. Also, the counter
phenomenon might be due to low competition and inefficiencies in the formal sector
which prevents banks to take advantage of policy rate fall.
Figure 2.5: IRF: Variation with Informal Intermediationa
a The figure to the left is the IRF generated for the fully restricted model while the
right-hand figure is the IRF of the unrestricted model with informal credit
intermediation.
Financial Development
The study used the ratio of private credit to GDP as a proxy for financial develop-
ment. Theory predicts financial development to bring about competition among
financial products. Hence, high level of financial development enhances monetary
transmission process. As suggested by the results depicted in Figure 2.7, financial
development decreases the pass-through estimates to 0.022. This fully materializes
in about a nine-month period. Contrasting with the estimates from the restricted
model, the estimates indicate that financial development reduces pass-through
marginally. This suggests that the level of competition among financial products
is very low in Ghana.
16 See the various issues of BoG financial stability reports
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Figure 2.6: IRF for Asymmetric VARa
a The figure to the left is the IRF generated for the fully restricted symmetric model
while the right-hand figure is the IRF of the fully restricted asymmetric model.
Figure 2.7: IRF: Variation with Financial Developmenta
a The figure to the left is the IRF generated for the fully restricted model while the
right-hand figure is the IRF of the unrestricted model with financial development.
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Asset Quality:
As an important determinant of pass-through, theory predicts countries with qual-
ity asset to have high long-term pass-through. Using the banking sector’s non-
performing loan share in total loans to measure asset quality, the study did not
find any significance on pass-through estimates. As depicted by figure 2.8, the
results of the study could not establish any significant differences for the two com-
paring models.
Figure 2.8: IRF: Variation with Asset Qualitya
a The figure to the left is the IRF generated for the fully restricted model while the
right-hand figure is the IRF of the unrestricted model with Asset Quality.
Liquidity Ratio
The study also found liquidity ratio has a substantial impact on pass-through.
The results as depicted in figure 2.9 suggests that liquidity ratio reduced the pass-
through estimates to 0.030.
In addition to the above VAR analysis, the study further estimated equation 2.15.
As specified in the equation, we regress the pass-through coefficients obtained
on the different set of explanatory variables. The rationale is to establish a re-
lationship and identify those variables that are statistically significant and have
meaningful signs.
Given the objective of the study, the emphasis is thus placed on the informal
credit indicator, which is the share of the non-bank financial institution (NBFI)
and micro-finance loans in the total banking, NBFI and micro-finance loan. Since
informal credit serves as a substitute to formal credit, the availability of informal
credit will restrict how commercial banks change the prices (retail rates) on their
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Figure 2.9: IRF: Variation with Liquidity Ratioa
a The figure to the left is the IRF generated for the fully restricted model while the
right-hand figure is the IRF of the unrestricted model with Liquidity Ratio.
products. As a result, a policy rate increase will not translate the one-to-one in-
crease in retail rate. Thus, a negative relationship between informal intermediation
and pass-through estimates is expected.
Table 2.6 presents the regression results. As expected and consistent with figure
2.5 a negative relationship was identified for informal activities. This suggests that
informal credit intermediation restrict the commercial banks’ ability to pass on
policy actions to the real sector via an increase in retail rates.
Regarding the other determinants, the results from the estimation are con-
sistent with other studies. Similar to studies like Sorensen and Werner (2006),
the estimation results of this study found a negative relationship between bank’s
liquidity and the strength of pass-through. This is also consistent with theoreti-
cal predictions. In excessively liquid markets, when all banks are structurally on
the same side of the market, interbank trading in short-term funds dries up, and
interest rates fail to reflect the true marginal cost of financial resources. Natu-
rally, retail pricing of loans becomes less responsive to money market rates and
the connection between the two weakens.
However, some of the estimates are in contrast to findings from related studies.
For example, whilst studies such as Sander and Kleimeier (2004); Gigineishvili
(2011); Saborowski and Weber (2013) identified asset quality (NPLR) to improve
pass-through, the findings of this study did not find any significant relationship.
Given that non-performing loans reflect the degree of credit risk, the risk premium
demanded by banks will be higher if NPLR is higher. The already high lending
rate has the possibility of attracting riskier projects if banks respond to rising
short-term rates. The likelihood of incurring additional losses will restrain banks
to respond to increase in short-term rates. Therefore, profit maximizing banks will
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not respond to policy rate when its asset quality is already poor. But the result
from this study suggests that banks in Ghana possibly might not factor NPLR in
their retail pricing decision.
Table 2.6: Regression Results
variable coefficient P-Value
NPLR -0.039 0.3017
NBLR -0.357 0.0000***
LR -1.394 0.0000***
DCP -0.697 0.0000***
GDP 0.063 0.0151**
C 0.0130 0.0000***
** (***) indicates significance at 5% and 1% respectively.
2.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendation
In conclusion, the study found weak pass-through for Ghana. Estimated average
pass-through is approximately 3.5 percent, which is far lower than the one found
for developing economies with characteristics similar to Ghana. The weak pass-
through shows that monetary policy is very weak in Ghana. This indicates limited
monetary authority’s control on economic variables especially interest rates. The
weak pass-through is further dampened by factors such as excess liquidity ratio
and non-performing loans as the study identified them to adversely influence the
transmission process. Informal credit intermediation is found to have minimal
impact on monetary transmission. Thus, the study concludes that the impact of
informal credit intermediation on monetary transmission is small, hence informal
credit activities cannot be a major factor in explaining monetary ineffectiveness in
Ghana. However, this not withstanding, the impact cannot be underestimated.
The findings of the study have a number of policy implication for the con-
duct of monetary policy in developing economies, particularly Ghana. Generally,
the weak pass-through casts doubts on the effectiveness of the hitherto approach
of implementing monetary policy in Ghana. The effectiveness of the traditional
framework relies on the ability of the central bank to influence the intermediate
target (i.e. interest rates). The inability to control interest rates limit the abil-
ity to influence the real economy. This thus warrants a new approach that can
circumvent the intermediate target. To achieve this, the central bank can adopt
some unconventional approaches that bypass the intermediate targets.
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Also, the findings of the study beget some revelations that require further
investigation. The asymmetry results suggest that the effect of informal interme-
diation on pass-through change for policy rate fall is very low compared to that
of a policy rate rise. This counter phenomenon might be due to low efficiency in
the financial sector or possible behavioral characteristics of the banks that support
it. This requires an investigation into the financial structure of Ghana amidst the
development of informal credit activities to produce a policy framework that will
ensure monetary effectiveness.
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3The Effect of Exogenous Shocks with
Informal Credit Intermediation.
Abstract
Informal banking has gained prominence in the financial market of many countries. Its
contributions to economic growth cannot be underestimated. Even though, it emerged in
response to the credit needs of some sectors of the economy, it activities are interrelated
with the formal banking system. This study therefore, investigates the effect of shocks on
an economy given the co-existing relationship between formal and informal banks. Using
a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with an informal bank, the
study showed that the effect of monetary policy on the informal banks is different from
the effect on the formal banks. While the formal bank reacts to monetary tightening
by decreasing credit issuance, the informal bank reacts by increasing credit issuance.
However, a credit shock to the informal bank has a similar effect on the economy as a
credit shock to the formal bank. Therefore, the study recommends that informal credit
activities should be fully regulated and monitored to prevent potential risk emanating
from this sector.
Keywords: Informal Credit Intermediation, DSGE and Ghana
JEL Classification: E52, E54, G210
3.1 Introduction
Within the past decades, the world’s economy has been characterized by var-ious economic and financial turmoils. Post-crisis evidence suggests that
credit restrictions and banking activities are potential factors that trigger financial
crisis and economic downturns (Vogiazas & Alexiou, 2013). This evidence height-
ened interests of business cycle theorists to incorporate banking sector activities in
the traditional macroeconomic frameworks. The purpose is to understand the in-
teractions between the real economy and the financial system for policy evaluation
and forecasting.
Following this, the hitherto workhorse of General Equilibrium Models used
in studying the dynamics of macroeconomic variables, which lacked interactions
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between the financial and credit markets and the real economy, incorporated fi-
nancial frictions in different forms (Iacoviello, 2005; Gertler & Karadi, 2011; Gerali
et al., 2010). These models provided the financial market with an explicit role in
analyzing monetary impulses in most advanced economies.
Notwithstanding this theoretical advancement, the existing models have inad-
equately addressed the peculiarities that characterize the financial system of many
developing and emerging economies. A common characteristic of the financial sys-
tem of these economies is financial dualism1 in the context of formal and informal
financial(banking) activities.
Informal financial activities have overtime grown to become a major charac-
teristic of the financial system of most developing economies. Informal banking
emerged to provide products that are flexible and tailored to offer adequate finan-
cial services to the large percentage of people who do not fit into the main formal
or commercial banking system. It was to serve as a tool to mop up extra liquidity
while offering other social intervention services to bring economic empowerment
to the poor. These activities, overtime, have grown to become very prominent
not only in the financial system of developing countries but developed countries
alike. Its share of volume in total financial system intermediation is estimated to
be about 40 percent in total world financial intermediation (Financial Stability
Board (2014)).
The co-existence of formal and informal banks has begotten some characteristic
in the economies they are found. First, this financial duality has resulted in the
co-existence of different financial instruments and their associated interest rates.
Second, it also has implication for fiscal and monetary policies2 with possible
adverse outcome on the aggregate economy. Also, financial development and the
evolution of the financial sector have engendered some interrelationship between
the formal and informal sector. For instance, the structure and mode of operations
underpinning the establishment of informal banks have transformed magnificently
over the years. The core activities of informal banks have transformed into major
financial activities whose activities do not only cater for the poor but also include
1Financial dualism is the co-existence of organized and unorganized money market. The
organized money market consists of the central bank, the commercial banks and other formal
financial institutions. The unorganized money market includes informal financial institutions
such as indigenous bankers, moneylenders, and micro-finance activities. By this, the study defines
formal bank to be the universal or commercial banks that are required to keep reserves with the
central bank, while informal bank include micro-finance and Non-bank Financial Institution
(NBFI).
2With dualism, fiscal and monetary policy tends to affect the real sector differently with
possible adverse outcome on the aggregate economy. For example, expansionary monetary policy
tends to favor the formal sector by creating cheap money in this sector, thus suffocating agents
that operate with the informal sector (Altunbas et al., 2009).
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activities which were previously solely performed by formal banks3. Despite the
transformation in informal bank’s activities, which overlaps that of the formal
bank, these banks operate under different regulatory framework of central banks.
The foregoing discussion begets some important questions: I) How are mon-
etary impulses transmitted through the economy when there is informal banking
activity? II) Given that informal banking falls outside the regular banking sys-
tem, however linked to the regular banking system, does a shock from the informal
credit market has any consequential effect on monetary aggregates? This is be-
cause, the literature documents that credit shocks that affect financial market have
important repercussion on the real sector.
Following the above questions, the study investigated the probable implication
of shocks when there is informal banking. Particularly, the study explored the
effect of monetary shock on the aggregate economy with or without the informal
financial market and under different interrelationship that exist between the formal
and informal banks. Though, the effect of an exogenous shock has been analyzed
in the literature for the formal bank, the case for an informal bank is limited. This
study thus contributes to the evidence in this regard.
Through the model analysis, the study showed that monetary actions affect
informal banks and formal banks differently. Whiles formal banks react to mon-
etary tightening by decreasing credit issuance, informal banks on the other hand
react by increasing credit issuance. As a result, the aggregate effect of monetary
tightening on credit depends on the relative size of the formal or informal credit
market. Also, the study showed that credit shock from the informal sector has
similar effect on the economy as credit shock emanating from the formal sector.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief
literature review whiles section 3.3 developed the model. Section 3.4 presents the
analysis of the study by numerically solving for the model properties. Section 3.5
concludes the study and provides some policy recommendation from the results of
the study.
3.2 Brief Literature Review
The literature identifies few papers that model informal (shadow) credit interme-
diation using the DSGE approach. The notable ones include Verona and Martins
(2013); Meeks et al. (2013); Mazelis (2014); Funke et al. (2015). Though, these
3Though, the activities of informal banking has transformed overtime, which has seen informal
banks performing similar activities to that of formal banks, thus they competing in a common
credit market, the study did not consider it in the modeling. Rather, the study modeled the two
banks to operate in separate credit markets with informal and formal banks operating with the
poor and rich households respectively.
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papers are closely related and complement each other in modeling the shadow
banking sector, they differ in some dimensions, particularly the role of shadow
banks in the economy. Verona and Martins (2013) was concerned with the adverse
selection effect of shadow banking on boom bust events caused by persistent low in-
terest rate level. By this, they considered a financial accelerator DSGE model with
formal banks investing in low risky projects whiles informal retail banks provide
funding to riskier firms.
Mazelis (2014) explored the impact of monetary policy shocks on aggregate loan
supply with both commercial and shadow banks. The paper extended Gertler
and Karadi (2011) model with a non-bank financial intermediary to distinguish
between bank and non-bank intermediaries based on the liquidity of their credit
claims. In the model, banks could endogenously create deposits to fund their
loans, however, non-banks had to raise deposits on the funding market to function
as intermediaries. The funding market is modeled via search and matching by non-
banks for available deposits of households. The paper showed that because deposit
creation responds to economy-wide productivity automatically, bank reaction to
shocks correspond to the balance sheet channel whiles non-banks are constrained
by the available deposits making their behavior better explained by the lending
channel. However, the two credit channels are affected differently following a
monetary policy shock. By these counteracting effects, the study showed that an
increasing non-bank sector leads to a reduced reaction of aggregate loan supply
following a monetary policy shock, which is consistent with the data.
Meeks et al. (2013) modeled the shadow sector similar to Mazelis (2014). How-
ever, unlike Mazelis (2014), Meeks et al. (2013) investigated how financial instabil-
ity emanating from commercial banks was unloaded as risky loans to off-balance
sheet shadow banks through securitization.
Funke et al. (2015) modeled multifaceted interactions between non-standard
monetary policy, the traditional banking sector and shadow banking sector in
China to analyze monetary policy transmission with parallel shadow banking and
different degrees of interest rate controls. Comparing different interest rate liber-
alization scenarios, the study revealed that monetary policy shock increase feed-
through to the lending rate and investment under complete liberalization. Also,
tighter regulation of interest rates in the commercial banking sector in China led
to an increase in loans provided by the shadow banking sector.
This paper differs from the above existing studies in different dimensions. The
above studies modeled the financial market to include both formal and informal
banks operating separately in different markets according to its associated risk. In
their set-up, formal banks operate in the low risk enterprise markets whiles informal
banks deal with the high risk market. In this paper however, the study modeled the
formal bank to supply credit to rich household type and firms, while the informal
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bank supplies credits to the poor household type. Unlike the existing studies
that allowed only the formal bank to accumulates deposit, this study allowed the
informal bank to also accumulate deposit but only from the poor household type.
By this, though both the formal and the informal banks operate in a different credit
market, the banks exhibit similar characteristics in terms of credit intermediation.
The only difference is that unlike the formal bank that can access extra fund from
the inter-bank market, the informal bank has no such privilege. The study thus
explored how shocks propagate through the economy in the presences of informal
banks.
3.3 The Model
This section describes the model and explains its underlying assumptions. Since
the model developed was calibrated for the Ghanaian economy, the study modeled
the interplay of the agents especially the financial sector to mimic the characteris-
tics of the Ghanaian economy. Notwithstanding this, the study made no attempt
to model the complexities of the Ghanaian economy.
The model consists of a formal and an informal bank4. As noted in the intro-
ductory section, informal banks emerged in response to the credit needs of some
agents in the economy who cannot access credit facilities from the universal or
the formal banks. Hence, the informal banks emerged to provide financial services
for the “disadvantage” agents whose characteristics do not allow them to oper-
ate with the universal banks. Given this, the study classified the household into
two types - an ”r” and ”p” household types, who operate with formal and infor-
mal bank respectively. While the r household type only accesses credit facilities
from the formal bank, the p household type only accesses credit facilities from the
informal bank. The available loan a household can access is constrained by the
household’s future collateral holdings determined by their future labor income5.
This assumption by which the banks collateralize debt with future labor income is
different from studies such as Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali et al. (2010) that used
the housing stock as collateral to borrowing.
Both the formal and the informal bank exhibit similar characteristics except
that the formal bank operates under a constrained capital requirement regulations
of the central bank. As a result, this bank has a wholesale branch that participates
in the interbank market, thus linking their activities directly to the central bank.
4The distinction between formal and informal banks follows the descriptions espoused in
section 1.3.1
5The study adopted this assumption because it is consistent with how financial institutions
advance loans to households in Ghana. Even though, formal banks accept fixed assets as collat-
eral, we assume both banks accept future income as collateral for simplicity.
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Contrary, the informal bank is not under the constrained regulation of the central
bank. Their activities are rather linked indirectly to the central bank via the
formal bank as the intermediate route.
Since the formal bank has a wholesale branch, it can obtain extra deposits
from the inter-bank market. Contrary, the informal bank cannot participate in
the interbank market, however, when the bank is liquidity constrained, it can
obtain extra funds from the formal bank. Similarly, the informal bank deposits its
excess fund with the formal bank in the form saving for the informal bank. Given
this relationship, the capital structure of the formal bank is thus directly linked
to the central bank via the interbank activities while that of the informal is linked
indirectly through the formal bank. By this means, the central bank can directly
control the credit supply of formal bank but that of informal bank indirectly.
Also, both banks operate in a monopolistic competitive setting where they set
interest rates on deposits and loans to maximize profits. The banks accumulate
deposits from and offer loans to their respective household type.
The rest of the sector is modeled to follow the standard approach in the lit-
erature. From the description above, the economy consists of four major blocks.
These are the household (rich and poor type), the financial sector (formal and in-
formal), the entrepreneur, and the government. Figure 3.1 presents the schematic
description of the model. In the sections that follow, the behavior of the respective
agents is analyzed.
3.3.1 Household
The household block consists of p and r household type. The household consumes
and sells its labor services to the entrepreneur and accumulates wealth by engaging
with the financial sector. Each household type saves (deposit) and secures loans
from its respective bank.The representative agent maximizes the expected utility
given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βts
C1−θs,t
1− θ −
N1+φs,t
1 + φ
, (3.1)
where s ∈ {p, r} is the household type, βs is the discount factor which the agent
applies to its stream of utility, θ is the risk averse coefficient which measures the
risk nature of the agent, φ is Fricsh inverse elasticity of labor supply, and Ct and Nt
denote consumption bundle and labor supply respectively. The household resource
constraint is given by
Cs,t +Ds,t +
(
1 + rbs,t−1
Πt
)
Bs,t−1 = WtNs,t +
(
1 + rds,t−1
Πt
)
Ds,t−1 +Bs,t. (3.2)
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Figure 3.1: Schematic Model Description
Πt is the gross inflation defined as Pt/Pt−1, Wt is the wage rate, rbs,t, rds,t, Ds,t,
and Bs,t denote lending rate, deposit rate, deposit, and loan respectively for each
household type s ∈ {r, p}. The household also faces a liquidity constraint given
by
(1 + rbs,t)Bs,t ≤ µs,tEt (Wt+1Ns,tΠt+1) , (3.3)
where µs,t is the loan-to-value ratio (LTV). At its mean value, it measures the
value of credit amounts banks make available to each type of agents for a given
discounted value of the collateral. Following Gerali et al. (2010), the LTVs are
treated as shocks which behave stochastic. We study the effect of credit supply
restrictions on the real economy using the stochastic behavior of the LTVs. The
shock follows an AR(1) stochastic process specified as
µs,t = ρµsµs,t−1 + 
µs
t ,
where ρµs is the autoregressive coefficient and 
µs
t is an iid error term.
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The household maximizes utility by choosing optimal loan bundle Bs,t, deposit
bundle Ds,t, consumption bundle Cs,t and labor Ns,t. Using λs,t and vs,t as the
budget constraint multiplier and borrowing constraint multiplier respectively, the
FOCs are then given as
λs,tCs,t
θ = 1 (3.4)
Ns,t
φ = λs,tWt + vs,tµs,tEt (Wt+1pit+1) (3.5)
λs,t = βsEt
(
λs,t+1
(
1 + rds,t
Πt+1
))
(3.6)
(1 + rbs,t)vs,t + βsEt
(
λs,t+1
(
1 + rbs,t
Πt+1
))
= λst (3.7)
3.3.2 Entrepreneur
The paper followed Gerali et al. (2010) approach to model the behavior of the
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur e aimed at maximizing its lifetime consumption
using income derived from output production. That is, the entrepreneur maximizes
its lifetime consumption given by equation 3.8.
Eo
∞∑
t=o
βte
(
C1−θe,t
1− θ
)
. (3.8)
Where βe and Ce,t are the entrepreneur’s discount factor and consumption respec-
tively. The entrepreneur produces intermediate good by combining effective labor
and capital using a Cobb-Douglas production technology function given as
Yt = AtKαt N1−αe,t , (3.9)
where Yt, Kt and Net denote intermediate good, capital and labor demand respec-
tively. α is the capital share in output production. Ne,t at equilibrium equals the
total labor supply from the rich and the poor household (i.e. Ne,t = Nr,t + Np,t).
At is technology shock which is exogenous determined according to an AR(1)
stochastic process of the form
At = ρAAt−1 + A,t, (3.10)
where A,t is the innovation component which is an iid.
The intermediate good is produced in a competitive market at a wholesale price
Pwt . The entrepreneur uses the realized income to finance its consumption patterns.
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The entrepreneur also borrows from the formal bank to finance its production
activities. Therefore, the resource constraint of the entrepreneur is given as
Ce,t +WtNe,t +
(
1 + rbe,t−1
pit
)
Be,t−1 + qtKt =
Yt
xt
+Be,t + qt(1− δ)Kt−1, (3.11)
where x−1t is the price in terms of consumption good of the intermediate good
produced by each entrepreneur with xt defined as pt/pwt . qt is the rental price of
capital and δ is the rate of capital depreciation. rbe,t is the lending rate facing the
entrepreneur and Be,t represents the entrepreneur loan. Also, the entrepreneur
borrowing is constrained by its holdings of physical capital (i.e. the balance sheet
constraint) given by(
1 + rbe,t
)
Be,t ≤ µe,tEt (qt+1Πt+1(1− δ)Kt) (3.12)
Like the household, µe,t is the LTV shock that follows AR(1) stochastic process of
the form specified in equation (3.13) and it is used to study credit restriction to
the entrepreneur.
µe,t = ρµeµe,t−1 + 
µe
t (3.13)
where µet is an iid error term.
The entrepreneur’s problem is to maximize lifetime consumption given in equa-
tion 3.8 subject to Equations 3.9, 3.11 and 3.12. The resulting FOCs, where λe,t
and ve,t represent the budget and liquidity constraint multipliers respectively, are
given as
λe,tqt =
λe,tαYt
xtKt
+ ve,tµe,tEt (qt+1Πt+1(1− δ)) + βeEt [λe,t+1qt+1(1− δ)] (3.14)
λe,t = ve,t(1 + rbe,t) + βeEt
(
λe,t+1
(
1 + rbe,t
Πt+1
))
(3.15)
Wt = (1− α) Yt
xtNe,t
(3.16)
Loans Demand and Deposit Supply
Loan Demand: r and P households purchase loan (credit) contract supplied
by their respective formal and informal banks. The credit bundle Bs,t is the total
credit demand of a continuum of credits types (j) represented on the interval [0, 1].
The credit bundle Bs,t follows a CES function given as
Bs,t =
(∫ 1
0
Bs,t(j)
b,s−1
b,s dj
) b,s
b,s−1
(3.17)
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b,s is the elasticity of substitution between credits. The expenditure (interest
payment) associated with the credit demand is given by∫ 1
0
rbs,t(j)Bs,t(j)dj (3.18)
where rbs,t is the interest rate facing the household. The problem of the household
is to choose credit vector that minimizes total interest payment. The resulting
credit demand schedule is given by aggregating f.o.c’s across agent
Bs,t(j) = Bs,t
(
rbs,t(j)
rbs,t
)−b,s
(3.19)
The average interest rate on loans to household is given by the composite aggre-
gation
rbs,t =
(
rbs,t(j)
1−b,s) 11−b,s (3.20)
The loan demand schedule for the entrepreneur is obtained in a similar fashion
and is equal to
Be,t(j) = Be,t
(
rbe,t(j)
rbe,t
)−b,e
. (3.21)
Deposit Supply: Analogous to the way credits are contracted, each household
type purchases deposits from its respective bank in order to save. Following the
Stiglitz-Dixit framework, the aggregate deposit demand (Ds,t) of each household
type s ∈ {p, r} is the sum total of individual units (Ds,t(j)). The aggregate deposit
demand thus follows a CES form specified as
Ds,t =
(∫ 1
0
Ds,t(j)
d,s−1
d,s dj
) d,s
d,s−1
, (3.22)
where d,s is the elasticity between deposits. The interest return on deposit is given
by ∫ 1
0
rds,t(j)Ds,t(j)dj, (3.23)
where rds,t is the deposit rate the household receive on its deposit. The household
chooses deposit bundle that maximizes total interest return. The deposit demand
schedule is thus given as
Ds,t(j) = Ds,t
(
rds,t(j)
rds,t
)−d,s
. (3.24)
Accordingly, the average deposit rate is given as
rds,t =
(
rds,t(j)
1−d,s) 11−d,s . (3.25)
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3.3.3 Financial Sector
The financial sector is the key component of this model. The sector consists
of a formal and an informal bank. The formal bank accumulates deposits from
the patient r household type and supplies credits to the impatient r household
type, the entrepreneur and the informal bank (when it is liquidity constrained).
Similarly, the informal bank accumulates deposits from the patient p household
type and supplies credit to the impatient p household type. Both banks have
retail branches: deposit branch and loan branch responsible for collecting deposits
and issuing loans respectively. Also, the formal bank has a wholesale branch in
addition while the informal bank does not. A further distinctive feature is that
the formal bank is regulated by the central bank while the informal bank is not.
The formal bank is regulated via capital requirements of the central bank, hence
it has a higher cost than the informal bank.
From the above characteristics, the flow of funds is given as follows. The
formal bank collects deposits from patient r household via the deposit branch and
then passes the raised funds to the wholesale unit, which pays the branch at a
rate. The loan branch then takes loan from the wholesale branch, differentiate
them at no cost and resell them to the impatient r household, the entrepreneur,
and to the loan branch of the informal bank. Similarly, the informal deposit
branch takes deposit from the patient p household and passes the raised fund
to the formal deposit branch. The informal loan branch then takes the deposit
generated by the informal deposit branch, differentiate at no cost and resell them
to the p household6. Figure 3.2 shows the fund flow among the various sector of
the economy. Following these relations, the central bank can directly control the
credit supply of the formal bank by influencing the capital structure and interest
rate of formal banks but not that of the informal bank directly.
Both banks operate in a monopolistic competitive environment, which enable
them to set prices (rates) on their instruments. The goal of each bank is to maxi-
mize profit from their intermediation process. Another key feature of the financial
sector is that the banks adhere to the balance sheet identity which postulates that
total loans should be equivalent to total deposits and bank equity.
6In this model we assumed that the formal bank serves as a "vault" (i.e. a wholesale banker)
to the informal bank. The relationship between the formal bank and the informal bank is the
same as the relationship between the retail branches of the formal bank and its wholesale branch.
This assumption though conforms to practice, it helps link informal activities to formal activities
and consequently the central bank.
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Figure 3.2: Funds Flow in the Economy
Formal Bank
The formal bank consists of a wholesale and retail branches7. The wholesale unit
manages the capital position and raises wholesale deposits and loans in the inter-
bank market. The retail branch consists of a deposit and loan branch which are
respectively responsible for raising differentiated deposits from the r household
and giving out differentiated loans to the r household, the entrepreneur, and the
informal loan branch. To ease the notation and consistently with the fact that
the formal sector deals with the r household indexed by r, deposits issued by the
formal bank is Dr,t. Total formal bank loan Bf,t is the sum of loans the formal
bank issued to the r household Br,t, entrepreneur Be,t and the informal bank Bp,t.
7It should be noted that the branches are not separated from one another. The wholesale
branch acts on behalf of the bank in the interbank market. As a result, the deposit it can
offer on the interbank market must be the same as the deposit accumulated from the household.
Similarly, the total loan it is willing to access from the inter-bank should be equivalent to the
total loans the retail branch offer to its clients or agents.
53
Thus,
Bf,t = Be,t +Bp,t +Br,t. (3.26)
Wholesale Branch: The wholesale branch combines net worth (capital and
deposit) to issue loans on the interbank market. The branch decides optimally
the liquidity to supply and the deposits to issue. It takes the interbank lending
interest rate as given and also, takes the policy rate set by the central bank as
given and remunerate deposits at that rate.
The wholesale activity is assumed to generate a cost related to the capital
position of the bank. That is, the bank pays a quadratic cost whenever the capital
to asset ratio
(
Kbt/Bf,t
)
deviates from the required value V b. The required value V b
is the regulatory capital requirement set for universal banks.
The capital Kbt of the bank accumulates according to
Kbt = (1− δb)Kbt−1 + ωbJ bt−1. (3.27)
where J b is the bank’s profit derived from retail intermediation process, ωb is the
ratio of retained profit, and δb is the resources used in managing bank capital and
conducting overall intermediation process.
The problem of this branch is to maximize profit subject to a balance sheet
constraint. Specifically,
Max
{Bf,t,Dr,t}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtr
(1 +Rbt)Bf,t − (1 +Rdt )Dr,t −Kbt − kkb2
(
Kbt
Bf,t
− V b
)2
Kbt

s.t. Bf,t = Dr,t +Kbt ,
(3.28)
where βr is the discount factor the bank applies to its income stream8, Rbt and Rdt
are the wholesale lending and deposit rates respectively, and kkb is the wholesale
intermediation cost.
Since this branch operates under perfect competitive environment, it takes the
lending and deposit rates as given. The decision of the branch is therefore, to
determine the total credits to access from the inter-bank market and also the total
deposit to extend to the market. The resulting foc is
∂
∂Bf,t
: βtr
(1 +Rbt)+ kkb
(
Kbt
Bf,t
− V b
)(
Kbt
Bf,t
)2 = λbt ,
∂
∂Dr,t
: −βtr
[(
1 +Rdt
)]
= λbt ,
8This paper assumed that the banks apply the discount factor of the rich household to their
profit. This follows the assumption that the r household owns both formal and informal banks
in the economy.
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where λbt is the Lagrange multiplier. Combining the above focs results in the
relation that links the spread between wholesale rates on loans and deposit with
the leverage ratio. The relation is given as
Rbt = Rdt − kkb
(
Kbt
Bf,t
− V b
)(
Kbt
Bf,t
)2
. (3.29)
It is assumed that banks remunerate deposit at an interest rate equal to the policy
rate rt set by the central bank, that is Rdt = rt. The policy rate rt is used to
conduct monetary policy, and it follows a Taylor rule as specified and explained in
section 3.3.6. Given the above relation, the wholesale loan rate prevailing in the
interbank market becomes
Rbt = rt − kkb
(
Kbt
Bf,t
− V b
)(
Kbt
Bf,t
)2
. (3.30)
Equation 3.30 prescribes the role of capital in determining loan supply. The re-
lation indicates that as far as there exist wedge between loan and the policy rate
the bank would increase loan supply, which will consequently increase leverage
and profit per unit capital (i.e. return on equity). At the same time, increasing
leverage reduces profit since the capital-to-asset ratio moves away from the capital
required ratio V b. This trade-off causes the bank to choose loan level such that
the marginal cost for reducing the capital-to-asset ratio is exactly equal to the
loan-deposit interest rate spread.
Loan Branch: This branch takes wholesale loans from the wholesale unit at
the rate Rbt , differentiates them at zero cost and resell them to impatient r house-
hold and entrepreneurs. The branch also gives loans facilities to the informal loan
branch in the event the latter is liquidity constrained. The branch advances loan to
the informal bank at the same rate as the entrepreneur9. The bank faces quadratic
adjustment cost for changing interest rates. The rational is to introduce stickiness
to capture imperfect pass-through. Parameterizing the cost the branch incur while
extending loans to household and entrepreneur as kbr and kbe respectively, then
the branch will optimize its profit specified as:
Max
rbr,t(j),rbe,t(j)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtr
rbr,t(j)Br,t(j) + rbe,t(j)Be,t(j) + rbe,t(j)Bp,t −RbtBf,t−
kbr
2
(
rbr,t(j)
rbr,t−1(j)
− 1
)2
rbr,t(j)Br,t(j)−
kbe
2
(
rbe,t(j)
rbe,t−1(j)
− 1
)2
rbe,t(j)Be,t(j)
. (3.31)
9In practice, formal banks operate with informal banks on special arrangements. However, in
this study, it is assumed that formal banks operate with informal banks as business entity, hence
the formal bank advances loans to the informal bank at the same rate as the entrepreneur.
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It is worth recalling that Br,t, Be,t and Bp,t represent loan credits that the formal
bank offers the rich household, the entrepreneur and informal bank respectively.
The profit maximization problem of the branch is to choose retail interest rates
rbr,t(j) and rbe,t(j) subject to the demand schedules respectively for the household
and entrepreneur as
Br,t(j) =
(
rbr,t(j)
rbr,t
)−br
Br,t, (3.32)
Be,t(j) =
(
rbe,t(j)
rbe,t
)−e
Be,t, (3.33)
where Bf,t = Br,t + Be,t + Bp,t. The resulting FOCs stipulate the lending interest
rate equation for the entrepreneur and rich household respectively as
1− e +
(
Bp,t
Be,t
)
+
(
Rbt
rbe,t
)
e − kbe
(
rbe,t
rbe,t−1
− 1
)
rbe,t
rbe,t−1
+
βrEt
(λpt+1
λpt
)
kbe
(
rbe,t+1
rbe,t
)2 (
rbe,t+1
rbe,t
− 1
)(
Be,t+1
Be,t
) = 0, (3.34)
1− br +
(
Rbt
rbr,t
)
br − kbr
(
rbr,t
rbr,t−1
− 1
)
rbr,t
rbr,t−1
+
βrEt
(λpt+1
λpt
)
kbr
(
rbr,t+1
rbr,t
)2 (
rbr,t+1
rbr,t
− 1
)(
Br,t+1
Br,t
) = 0, (3.35)
Deposit Branch: The deposit branch performs its operations in reversed
form. This branch collects deposits Dr,t(j) from the savers of the r household and
then passes the accumulated funds to the wholesale unit at rate Rdt . The deposit
branch also accepts deposit Dp,t from the informal bank, and pays the bank the
same interest rate it pays savers of the rich household. Analogous to the loan
branch, the deposit branch incurs a quadratic adjustment cost kdr for changing
the deposit rate. The aim of the branch is to choose the retail deposit rate rdr,t(j)
to maximize profit. Formally,
Max
rdr,t(j)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtr
Rdt(Dr,t(j) +Dp,t)− rdr,t(j)Dr,t(j)− rdr,t(j)Dp,t
− kdr2
(
rdr,t(j)
rdr,t−1(j)
− 1
)2
rdr,t(j)Dr,t(j)
 (3.36)
s.t.Dr,t(j) =
(
rdr,t(j)
rdr,t
)−dr
Dr,t (3.37)
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The FOC for optimal deposit interest rate setting is
−1 + dr −
(
Dp,t
Dr,t
)
− dr
(
Rdt
rdr,t
)
− kdr
(
rdr,t
rdr,t−1
− 1
)
rdr,t
rdr,t−1
+
βrEt
(λpt+1
λpt
)
kdr
(
rdr,t+1
rdr,t
)2(rdr,t+1
rdr,t
− 1
)(
Dr,t+1
Dr,t
) = 0 (3.38)
Informal Bank
The informal bank intermediates between borrowers and depositors of the p house-
hold by accepting deposits from savers, and also providing loan to borrowers. The
bank exhibits similar characteristics to that of the formal bank in its operations
except that it does not engage in inter-bank market activities. Rather, the bank
deposits its fund with the formal bank deposit branch at the prevailing deposit
rate, and also, takes funds from the loan branch of the formal bank at the same
interest rate that faces the entrepreneur10. As a result of this, the informal bank
interest rate setting condition is not directly affected by central bank’s action (i.e.
policy rate), rather via the intermediate route of formal banks. Following a similar
modeling approach in the formal sector, the informal bank has two retail branches
- a loan and deposit branch responsible for extending loans and collecting deposits
respectively. Since the informal bank deals with the poor household indexed p,
loans and deposits issued by the informal bank are denoted respectively Bp,t and
Dp,t to ease notation.
Deposit Branch: This branch collects deposit Dp,t(j) from the p household
savers at an interest rate rdp,t(j) and then passes the raised fund to the formal
deposit branch at rate rdr,t. The bank incurs a quadratic adjustment cost (kdm).
The profit maximization problem of the branch is give as
Max
rdp,t(j)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtr
rdr,tDp,t(j)− rdp,t(j)Dp,t(j)− kdm2
(
rdp,t(j)
rdp,t−1(j)
− 1
)2
rdp,t(j)Dp,t(j)

(3.39)
s.t.Dp,t(j) =
(
rdp,t(j)
rdp,t
)−dp
Dp,t (3.40)
where rdr,tDp,t(j) is the total value of deposits passed to the formal deposit branch,
rdr,t is the formal deposit rate the branch received as return on its deposit. and
10The mechanism where informal bank passes its deposits to the formal bank, and also takes
loan from it, is similar to the relationship that exists between the retail branches of the formal
bank and the wholesale branch. By this means, the formal bank serves as "vault" for the informal
bank. Though, this mechanism is evident in practice, it is also a modeling device to link informal
banking activities to that of the formal bank
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rdp,t(j)Dp,t(j) is total value of deposit collected from the poor household. The
branch optimizes with respect to the deposit rate rdp.t(j). The first order condition
results in the pricing relation for informal deposit rate specified as
−1 + dp − dp
rdr,t
rdp,t
− kdm
(
rdp,t
rdp,t−1
− 1
)
rdp,t
rdp,t−1
+
βr
(λpt+1
λpt
)
kdm
(
rdp,t+1
rdp,t
)2 (
rdp,t+1
rdp,t
− 1
)(
Dp,t+1
Dp,t
) = 0 (3.41)
Loan Branch: This branch takes accumulated deposits from the deposit
branch, differentiates them at no cost and resell them to the p household borrowers.
It takes loan from the formal loan branch in the advent of cash shortage. It incurs
cost kbm to advance the loans. The profit of the branch is specified as
Max
rbp,t(j)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtr
rbp,t(j)Bp,t(j)− rbe,tBp,t(j)− kbm2
(
rbp,t(j)
rbp,t−1(j)
− 1
)2
rbp,t(j)Bp,t(j)

(3.42)
where rbe,tBp,t is the value of loan accessed from the formal loan bank, and rbe,t is
the interest cost of the loan. The branch maximizes its profit by choosing interest
rate rbp,t(j) subject to the demand schedule
Bp,t(j) =
(
rbp,t(j)
rbp,t
)−bp
Bp,t (3.43)
The FOC from the above problem gives the retail pricing equation for the poor
household. This is specified as
1− bp + bp
rbe,t
rbp,t
− kbm
(
rbp,t
rbp,t−1
− 1
)
rbp,t
rbp,t−1
+
βr
(λpt+1
λpt
)
kbm
(
rbp,t+1
rbp,t
)2 (
rbp,t+1
rbp,t
− 1
)(
Bp,t+1
Bp,t
) = 0 (3.44)
From the equation, the loan rate in this sector does not depend directly on the
interbank rate, rather, indirectly through rbe,t. The speed of adjustment depends
on the cost of changing interest rate and the discount factor. This is different
from that of the formal sector whose pricing decisions directly depend on the
policy rate and the elasticity of substitution. This unique characteristic makes the
informal sector price-setting directly dependent on formal activities but indirectly
dependent of monetary authorities.
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3.3.4 Retailers
Retailers are only brander who purchase intermediate goods from entrepreneurs
at wholesale price Pwt . They operate in a monopolistic competitive environment
and differentiate the goods at zero cost. Retailers set price at a mark-up over
wholesale price and index prices to past prices at a degree. Retailers are assumed
to index prices to a combination of past and steady state inflation, with relative
weights parametrized by l. They also face quadratic price adjustment cost κp
when changing prices. The rational is to introduce prices stickiness in the model.
Retailers thus choose optimal price level pj,t) by solving the problem
Max
pj,t
Et
∞∑
t=0
βte
pj,tyjt − Pwt yj,t − kp2
(
pj,t
pj,t−1
− pilt−1pi1−l
)2
ptyt

s.t yj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)−yt
yt
(3.45)
Imposing symmetric equilibrium, the FOC results in a non-linear Philip curve for
price inflation specified as
1−yt +yt
Pw
P
−κp
(
pit − pilt−1pi1−l
)
pit+βpEt
(
λpt+1
λpt
κp
(
pit+1 − piltpi1−l
)
pit+1
yt+1
yt
)
= 0
(3.46)
3.3.5 Capital Producers
Capital producers provide the capital demanded by the entrepreneur. Modeling
the capital producer helps to derive the market price for capital, which is necessary
to determine the value of entrepreneurs’ collateral, against which banks concede
loans. The problem of the capital producer follows the standard approach with
detailed description in Dib (2009). The firm at beginning of each period purchases
final good (It) from retailers and stock of un-depreciated capital (1− δ)Kt−1 from
entrepreneurs. Old capital is converted on one-to-one into new capital, but trans-
forming final good involves quadratic adjustment cost (κi). The firm maximizes
the objective function
Max
It
Et
∞∑
0
βte
qt
It − κi2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2− It
 (3.47)
The aggregate capital stock evolves according to
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +
1− κi2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2 It (3.48)
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The real price of capital qt resulting from the maximization problem is given by
1 = qt
1− κi2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− κi
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
It
It−1
+
βeEt
(
λEt+
λEt
qt+1κi
(
It+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2) (3.49)
3.3.6 Monetary Policy
The central bank conducts monetary policy through a Taylor-rule function. It sets
the short-term nominal interest rate rt in response to a deviation of output yt and
inflation pit from their respective target level. The interest rate reaction function
is thus given as:
rt = rtr
(
pit
pi
)φpi ( yt
yt−1
)φy
(3.50)
where φpi and φy are the weights assigned to inflation and output stabilization
respectively. r is the steady state nominal interest rate and rt is an exogenous
monetary policy shock, which follows AR(1) stochastic process.
Monetary Transmission
Monetary transmission is the mechanism through which the central bank influences
the economy. The financial sector plays a major role in this regard. The process
involves the central bank using its policy rate to influence retail interest rates and
consequently influencing the real economy. From the model description, there are
various interest rates in the economy. Table 3.1 gives the interest rates in the
model and their descriptions.
Conducting monetary policy in the model description, the central bank uses a
Taylor rule specification as in equation 3.50. A monetary shock via equation 3.50
affects the inter-bank (wholesale) lending rate through equation 3.30. This subse-
quently influences the lending rate of the formal bank via equations 3.35 and 3.34.
Further, monetary policy affects the lending rate of informal banks through the
lending rate of formal banks as indicated in equation 3.44. Analogously, monetary
transmission to the deposit rate follows the same mechanism.
The effect of monetary policy on the real sector is through the intermediate
effect that interest rate has on consumption through the Euler equation in the
household sector.
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Table 3.1: Variable Description
Interest Rate Description
rbr,t formal bank lending rate to rich household
rbe,t Formal bank lending rate to entrepreneur
rdr,t Formal bank deposit rate to rich household
rbp,t Informal bank lending rate to poor household
rdp,r Informal bank deposit rate to poor household
Rbt Interbank lending rate
Rdt Interbank deposit rate
rt Monetary policy rate
3.3.7 Aggregation
In the model set-up, there are two type of households and financial intermediaries.
As a result, the total available credit is given by the sum of credits advanced by
both formal and informal banks. At equilibrium, the total credit advanced by the
financial intermediaries must equal the total credit demand by the household and
firm. Given the total share of informal banks in the economy as z, then aggregate
credit is given by
Bt = Bzpt(BrtBet)
(1−z).
Also, aggregate consumption is given by
Ct = CgptCvrtC
(1−v)
et ,
where g is the share of poor household, and v is the share of rich household.
3.4 Model Analysis
The preceding sections focused on the model descriptions. In the sections that
follow, the quantitative properties of the model are investigated. First, the study
presents the model parameterization and explains the numerical solution method
used. Next the dynamics of the linearized model are investigated using impulse
responses. The study then analyzes the effect of monetary, technology, and credit
shocks considering how the shocks propagate through the economy, both with and
without informal banks. Further, we investigate the effect of monetary policy on
aggregate loan supply depending on the relative share of intermediation through
the informal banking system in the economy.
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3.4.1 Calibration
The model was calibrated to closely match the Ghanaian economy, drawing pa-
rameter estimates from a wide range of available information. The parameter
estimates were selected to capture specific ratios in the Ghanaian economy as
closely as possible, by ensuring the adherence to the model properties. However,
parameters that were not easily calibrated or available for Ghana were sourced
from the literature.
As described above, the model is characterized by heterogeneous agents in the
economy. Agents differ according to the discount factor they attached to their
lifetime utility, the elasticity of substitution for both credit and deposit. These
differences are associated with the different interest rate banks charge to their
client. The banks charge different interest rates11 because of factors such as the
different risk rich and poor agents posed to their respective banks. This is captured
in different numerical value attached to βp, βr, βe, bp and dp
The calibration for the informal sector concentrated on some major players in
the sector. This is because, the sector is characterized by heterogeneous players
hence, it is difficult to pin down a parameter value that is acceptable, applicable or
both for every part of the sector. The study chose calibrated parameters based on
available data and ensured that the chosen estimates conforms to the underlying
steady state relationship prescribed by the model. Accordingly, bp and dp were
set to 0.3 and -99 respectively. This is done to match the spread as provided by
the steady state relation which stipulates that the steady state spread between
informal lending rate and formal lending rate to the entrepreneur depends on bp.
Thus, the value is calibrated between the two rates to ensure a markup of 20
percent. Following the same analogy, we calibrate for the other elasticities.
The cost parameters of the formal bank, kdr, kkb and kbr were set respectively
at 110, 5 and 70. These parameters were estimated by Gerali et al. (2010) for
the euro market, hence, they were adopted for this study. The cost parameters
of the informal bank were calculated using data from Micro-finance Information
Exchange. We estimated the log-linearized relation of the informal lending rate
(equation 3.44) using Micro-finance Information Exchange data. The cost param-
eters were then deduced from the estimated coefficient. These parameters, kdm
and kbm were set respectively at 100 and 60.
We set the proportion of household who are poor g in the economy to 0.25.
This is in line with the extreme poverty ratio in Ghana estimated by GLSS V.
The discount factors βp and βr are set respectively to 0.975 and 0.990 to match a
steady-state deposit rate slightly above 5.4% and 5.2% for the informal and formal
11Interest rates charged by the informal banks are higher than that of the formal banks. Whiles
the average lending rate among the commercial banks is about 35% in the year 2014, that of
micro-finance is about 70% for the same year.
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bank respectively. Similarly, βe is set to 0.925.
The capital requirement V b of the formal bank is set at 0.09 according to
the capital requirement imposed by Basel II. This value is however, set slightly
higher than the Basel requirement. This is because most central banks peg their
requirement slightly above that of Basel requirements.
In the literature, there is not yet commonly accepted estimate for risk aversion
θ. However, the commonly accepted measure lies between 1 and 3, though there
are wide range of estimates in the literature12. Therefore, in accordance to the
literature, the risk averse coefficient θ is set at 2. Similarly, the capital share α is
set at 0.5. The auto-regressive coefficients ρ of the shocks were each set to 0.95.
The calibrated values are provided in Table 3.2
3.4.2 Numerical Solution
The non-linear model was solved with the occasional binding constraint for various
agents. That is, households’ total income must be equivalent to its expenditures.
Also, the total loan loans an impatient agent can access must in equilibrium be
equivalent to the expected value of collateral.
Using appropriate initial values, the study estimated the steady state values us-
ing a nonlinear equation solver. The nonlinear equation solver used is the Newton
method with quadratic searching. Further, the non-linear model was log-linearized
around the steady state using first order Taylor approximation. The steady states
relations and the log-linearized equations are provided in the technical appendix.
3.4.3 Response to Monetary Shock
This section presents the results of the behavior of the generated impulse response
function (IRF) for some selected aggregate variables to an unexpected monetary
tightening. We investigate the IRF to determine whether the inclusion of the
informal banks alters monetary transmission.
In the model description, there are various types of interest rates in the econ-
omy. These rates emanate from formal bank supplying credit to the rich household
and the entrepreneur; and informal bank supplying credit to the poor household.
As presented in Tale 3.1, the retail interest rates prevailing in the economy are
formal bank lending rate to rich household rbr,t, formal bank lending rate to en-
trepreneur rbe,t, formal bank deposit rate rdr,t, informal bank lending rate to poor
household rbp,t, and informal bank deposit rate rdp,t. The formal bank activity is
linked directly to the central bank via the inter-bank market while the informal
bank is linked indirectly via the formal bank.
12See among others, Chetty (2006); Campo et al. (2011); Kapteyn and Teppa (2011)
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The behavior of credits and interest rates to a monetary tightening is depicted
by the IRF shown in figure 3.3. Monetary tightening causes the interbank rate
to increase. This increase translates into increased funding cost of formal banks,
which simultaneously causes interest rate to rise for rich household and firms. The
rise in interest rate tightens credit availability to these agents. Regarding the
behavior in the informal market, the interest rate that poor household face by
banking with the informal bank is not affected by monetary shocks immediately.
It takes about a quarter before monetary shock causes interest rate in the informal
banks to increase. This is because, monetary shock influences informal bank indi-
rectly only via their interrelationship with the formal bank, thus creating some lag
in monetary transmission. Hence it is not surprising the effect of monetary shock
is not immediate on informal bank activities.
The effect of a monetary shock on formal bank credit is different from the effect
on informal bank credit. In line with the conventional view, contraction monetary
shock which results in interest rate increase leads to credit tightening to both
the rich household and the firm. In contrast, contraction monetary shock eases
credit availability to the poor household. The counter effect of monetary policy on
credit among informal banks could be due to the fact that informal banks’ credit
intermediation is not directly constrained by the central bank. This situation was
identified by studies such as Altunbas et al., 2009, Den Haan and Sterk, 2010,
and Igan et al., 2013, which showed that while universal banks react to monetary
tightening by reducing credit lending, non-banks conversely react by increasing
lending.
The overall effect of monetary tightening on aggregate credit is an initial in-
crease which declines steadily to approximately fourth quarters before rising again.
Hence, from the above its evident that the immediate effect of monetary contrac-
tions on loans in the presences of informal banking is an increase in credit avail-
ability. This is in contrast to situation without informal banking. This suggests
that the relative size of the formal and informal banking sector determines the
direction and effect of monetary policy in an economy with dual financial market.
3.4.4 Response to Technology Shock
In this section we investigate the IRF following a positive technology shock. We
consider the case of one standard deviation corresponding to 1% increase of the
goods producer’s productivity.
Following the standard mechanism, a positive technology shock increases the
marginal productivity of both labor and capital, which further causes investment to
increase. Increased investments raise the price of capital, consequently increasing
net worth whiles decreasing the desire for external finance.
In order to undertake investment activities (due to increase in investment),
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the entrepreneur’s demand for credit from the formal bank increases. This con-
sequently leads to interest rate increase. The resulting IRF function is showed in
figure 3.4. The figure shows that the presences of informal credit intermediation
do not affect how technology shock influences the economy.
3.4.5 Response to Credit Shock in the Informal Sector
The literature has identified credit restrictions to affect and influence aggregate
variables. The evidences are well documented for formal baning activities. Given
the interrelations between formal and informal credit activities, we investigated
the situation with both credit intermediation processes.
To achieve this, we treated the loan-to-value ratio as stochastic. We then
shocked the LTV and investigated the behavior of the IRFs generated. We con-
sidered a positive shock to the LTVs, a situation of one standard deviation cor-
responding to 1% increase of credit availability from the banking sector. The
generated IRFs for the credit supply shock to the rich household, poor household
and the entrepreneur are provided in figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. A qual-
itative inspection of the graphs reveals that the effect of credit shocks (i.e. formal
and informal credit shocks) are the same across all sectors. However, the IRFs
show that whiles credit shock to the rich household and entrepreneur has similar
quantitative effect on aggregate credit, this effect (which is about 0.5) is greater
than the effect of credit shock in the informal sector (which is about 0.13).
3.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, this study investigated the effect of monetary, credit, and technology
shocks in an economy with informal banks co-existing with formal banks. This
follows from the evidence that the activities of informal banks form an important
component of the financial sector of many developing economies. Notwithstanding,
this issue is not much investigated in the literature. Thus, this study contributes
to the literature in this regard.
The study found that monetary shock affect formal bank differently from the
informal bank. Whilst the formal bank react to monetary tightening by restricting
credit, informal banks on the other hand react by increasing credit. Whether the
aggregate credit will increase or decrease depends on whether informal activities
dominates or formal activities.
Further, the study found that a credit restriction in the informal sector has
similar effect as a credit restriction in the formal sector.
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Appendix
Table 3.2: Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Definition Value
θ Risk Averse coefficient 2
φ Fricsh inverse elasticity of labor supply 1.5
α Capital share in output production 0.5
φpi Inflation Stabilization weight 1.8
φy Output Stabilization weight 0.2
V b Optimal Capital Requirement 0.09
δb Bank Capital depreciation 0.15
kkb Wholesale Intermediation cost 5
kbr Loan adjustment cost to r household 70
kdr Deposit adjustment cost to r 110
kbm loan adjustment cost to p household 60
kdm deposit adjustment cost to p 100
dp Elasticity of substitution for p deposit 99
bp Elasticity of substitution for p credits 0.3265
br Elasticity of substitution for r credits 3
dr Elasticity of substitution for r deposits 0.588
e Elasticity of substitution for entrepreneur credits 5
y Elasticity of substitution for final goods 2
ρA AR coefficient of capital shock 0.95
ρer AR coefficient of Entrepreneur LTV shock 0.95
ρmur AR coefficient of r LTV shock 0.95
ρmup AR coefficient of p LTV shock 0.95
ρr AR coefficient of monetary shock 0.95
g Proportion of P 0.25
v Proportion of R 0.1849
βp P Discount Factor 0.990
βr R Discount Factor 0.975
βe Entrepreneur Discount factor 0.925
kp Retailers Adjustment cost 2
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Figure 3.3: IRFs to Monetary Shock
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Figure 3.4: IRFs to Technology Shock
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Figure 3.5: IRFs to R Household Credit Shock
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Figure 3.6: IRFs to P Household Credit Shock
Figure 3.7: IRFs to Firm Credit Shock
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4
Conclusion and Recommendation
The thesis presented two original papers on monetary policy effectiveness. It
began the investigation by reviewing the literature and highlighting the weakness
embedded in monetary implementation. Chapter one provided the literature on
effective monetary policy. From the literature surveyed, the chapter showed that
monetary policy is weak in influencing its target. As a result, this study is con-
ducted to identify factors that may affect monetary effectiveness.
Following from the evidence of weak monetary policy in developing economies
as identified in the literature presented in Chapter one, the thesis followed to inves-
tigate the potential reason for the weak pass-through. In view of this, this study
assumed that the relationship between formal and informal banks in the credit in-
termediation process could influence monetary pass-through. This is because while
the central bank through its policy tool can directly influence the credit issuance
of formal banks, it cannot do same to the informal bank. This is as result of infor-
mal bank’s activities not related directly with the central bank. This relationship
between the two type of banks could play an important role in the pricing decision
and credit issuance of formal banks, thus influencing the pass-through. This rela-
tionship was investigated empirically in chapter two using a Ghanaian data. The
findings from this chapter revealed that though pass-through estimates are very
low for Ghana, the presence of informal credit intermediation further dampens
it. The pass-through without informal credit intermediation is estimated at 0.033
and that with informal credit at 0.024. Therefore, it can be concluded that though
informal activities further dampen pass-through, its inclusion marginally affected
pass-through in Ghana.
Chapter three developed a DSGE model with informal credit intermediation.
The purpose was to study the effect of monetary and credit shocks on the economy
with the presence of informal credit activities. The study found that though
monetary shock affected the informal bank and formal bank differently, the effect
of credit shock from either the formal or informal bank is the same on the economy
Overall, the findings from the thesis highlights the need to strengthen the
current monetary policy design in Ghana to be more effective. Also, there is the
need to guide the activities of informal credit intermediaries to prevent possible
spillover effect from this sector. This study can be advanced in the following
dimensions
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• In the DSGE framework, the financial market was modeled to consist of
both formal and informal banks operating in different credit market. This
assumption followed the theoretical foundation that supported the estab-
lishment of informal banks. However, recent trend in the financial market
of Ghana shows that both formal and informal banks operate in a common
credit market. Hence, the paper can be extended to incorporate the case
where banks operate in common credit market. This is actually under con-
sideration in my next paper.
• Also, the paper can be extended to deal with optimal policy in the presence
of informal credit serving as leakages in the money multiplier process.
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ATechnical Appendix to "The Effect of
Exogenous Shocks with Informal
Credit Intermediation"
This appendix provides additional material for the study. It presents the full set
of equations, discusses the calibrations, provide details on the model construction
and describe the behavior through the log-linear version.
A.1 THE MODEL
A.1.1 Household
The household consists of the rich and Poor household type. The rich type accumu-
lates wealth by banking with the formal bank. Likewise, the poor also accumulates
wealth banking with the informal bank.
Poor Household (p):
Maximization problem
Max
Cp,t,Np,t,Bp,t,Dp,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtp
(
Cp,t
1−θ
1− θ −
Np,t
1+φ
1 + φ
)
s.t. Cp,t +Dp,t +
1 + rbp,t−1
pit
Bp,t−1 = WtNp,t +
1 + rdp,t−1
pit
Dp,t−1 +Bp,t(
1 + rbp,t
)
Bp,t ≤ µptEt (Wt+1Np,tpit+1)
(A.1)
Using λpt and vpt as the budget constraint and borrowing constraint multipliers
respectively, the FOCs are then given by
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1 = λptCθp,t
Nφp,t = λptWt + V pt µptEt[Wt+1pit+1]
λpt = βpEt
(
λpt+1
(
1 + rdp,t
pit+1
))
λpt = (1 + rbp,t)V
p
t + βpEt
[
λpt+1
(
1 + rbp,t
pit+1
)]
(A.2)
Rich Household ( r)
Maximization problem
Max
Cr,t,Nr,t,Br,t,Dr,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtr
(
Cr,t
1−θ
1− θ −
Nr,t
1+φ
1 + φ
)
s.t. Cr,t +Dr,t +
1 + rbr,t−1
pit
Br,t−1 = WtNr,t +
1 + rdr,t−1
pit
Dr,t−1 +Br,t(
1 + rbr,t
)
Br,t ≤ µrtEt (Wt+1Nr,tpit+1)
(A.3)
Using λrt and vrt as the budget constraint and borrowing constraint multipliers
respectively, the FOCs are then given by
1 = λrtCθr,t
Nφr,t = λrtWt + V rt µrtEt[Wt+1pit+1]
λrt = βrEt
(
λrt+1
(
1 + rdr,t
pit+1
))
λrt = (1 + rbr,t)V rt + βrEt
[
λrt+1
(
1 + rbr,t
pit+1
)]
(A.4)
A.1.2 Entrepreneur (e)
The entrepreneur solves the problem
Max Eo
∞∑
t=o
βte
[
C1−θe,t
1− θ
]
s.t. Yt = AtKαt Ne,t1−α
Ce,t +WtNe,t +
(
1 + rbe,t−1
pit
)
Bee,t−1 + qtKt =
Yt
xt
+Be,t + qt(1− δ)Kt−1(
1 + rbe,t
)
Be,t ≤ µetEt
(
qt+1pi(t+1)(1− δ)Kt
)
(A.5)
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The resulting FOCs are given by
λeqt =
λetαYt
xtkt
+ vetµeEt (qt+1pit+1(1− δ)) + βeEt
(
λet+1qt+1(1− δ)
)
λet = V et (1 + rbe,t) + βeEt
(
λet+1
(
1 + rbe,t
pit+1
))
Wt = (1− α) Yt
xtNe,t
(A.6)
A.1.3 Informal Banks
The representative informal bank consist of loan and deposit market
Loan market In this market banks do not participate in the inter bank market
i.e. wholesale market. The bank’s problem is thus given as Maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βrt
rbijtBijt − rbejtBijt − kbi2
(
rbijt
rbijt−1
− 1
)2
rbijtB
i
jt
 (A.7)
The branch maximizes its’ profit to choose retail rate rbit subject to the demand
schedules
Bijt =
(
rbijt
rbit
)−bpt
Bt (A.8)
Imposing a symmetric equilibrium condition of rt(j) = rt, the FOCs reduces to
retail rate pricing equation for household
1−bpt +bpt
rbet
rbit
−kbi
(
rbit
rbit−1
− 1
)
rbit
rbit−1
+βr
(λpt+1
λpt
)
kbi
(
rbit+1
rbit
)2 (
rbit+1
rbit
− 1
)(
Bit+1
Bit
) = 0
(A.9)
Deposit market Here the bank aim to minimize the cost of accumulating
deposit. The problem of the representative bank is given by:
MinE0
∞∑
t=0
βrt
rdrjtDijt − rdijtDijt − kdi2
(
rdijt
rdijt−1
− 1
)2
rdijtD
i
jt
 (A.10)
subject to the demand schedule
Dijt =
(
rdijt
rdit
)−dpt
Dt (A.11)
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Using the condition that rjt = rt at equilibrium, the FOCs result in the pricing
relation for deposit given as
−1+dpt −dpt
rdrt
rdit
−kdi
(
rdit
rdit−1
− 1
)
rdit
rdit−1
+βr
(λpt+1
λpt
)
kdi
(
rdit+1
rdit
)2 (
rdit+1
rdit
− 1
)(
Dit+1
Dit
) = 0
(A.12)
A.1.4 Formal Bank
Wholesale Market The problem of this branch is thus to choose loans (Bt)
and deposit (Dt) so as to maximize profit subject to a balance sheet constraint.
Specifically,
MaxE0
∞∑
0
λp0,t
(1 +Rbt)Bjt − (1 +Rdt )Djt −Kbjt − Kkb2
(
Kbjt
Bjt
− V b
)2
Kbjt

(A.13)
s.t.
Bfjt = D
f
jt +Kbjt (A.14)
Kbjt = (1− δb)Kb,njt−1 + ωbJ b,njt−1 (A.15)
The interbank lending rate is obtained through the FOC as
Rbt = Rdt − kkb
(
Kbt
Bt
− V b
)(
Kbt
Bt
)2
Loan Market The formal bank engages in the inter bank market. The prob-
lem of the representative agent is to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βrt
rbrjtBrjt + rbejtBejt + rbejtBijt −RbtBft − kbr2
(
rbrjt
rbrjt−1
− 1
)2
rbrjtB
r
jt −
kbe
2
(
rbejt
rbejt−1
− 1
)2
rbejtB
e
jt

(A.16)
The bank optimizes the profit by choosing {rbrt } and {rbet } subject to the demand
schedules respectively for the household and entrepreneur as
Brjt =
(
rbrjt
rbrt
)−brt
Brt (A.17)
Bejt =
(
rbejt
rbet
)−et
Bet (A.18)
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With Bfjt = Brjt +Bejt. The resulting FOC from the optimization problem is given
by
1−et+
(
Bit
Beft
)
+
(
Rbt
rbet
)
et−kbe
(
rbet
rbet−1
− 1
)
rbet
rbet−1
+βrEt
(λpt+1
λpt
)
kbe
(
rbet+1
rbet
)2 (
rbet+1
rbet
− 1
)(
Bet+1
Bet
) = 0
(A.19)
1−brt +
(
Rbt
rbrt
)
brt −kbr
(
rbrt
rbrt−1
− 1
)
rbrt
rbrt−1
+βrEt
(λpt+1
λpt
)
kbr
(
rbrt+1
rbrt
)2 (
rbrt+1
rbrt
− 1
)(
Brt+1
Brt
) = 0
(A.20)
Deposit Market The aim is to maximize the return it obtain from the inter
bank market and deposit accumulation from household. The bank maximize its
objective function
MaxE0
∞∑
t=0
βrt
{
RdtDjt − rdrjtDrjt −
kdr
2
( rdrjt
rdrjt−1
− 1
)2
rdrjtD
r
jt
}
(A.21)
subject to the supply
Drjt =
(
rdrjt
rdrt
)−drt
Dt (A.22)
−1+drt −drt
(
Rdt
rdrt
)
−kdr
(
rdrt
rdrt−1
−1
)
rdrt
rdrt−1
+βrEt
{(
λpt+1
λpt
)
kdr
(
rdrt+1
rdrt
)2(
rdrt+1
rdrt
−1
)(
Dft+1
Drt
)}
= 0
(A.23)
A.1.5 Retailer
The retailer solves
Et
∞∑
t=0
λPt
[
pjtyjt − PWt yjt −
kp
2
( pjt
pjt−1
− pilt−1pi1−l
)2
ptyt
]
(A.24)
subject to a consumption aggregate
yjt =
(
pjt
pt
)−yt
yt (A.25)
Imposing symmetric equilibrium, the FOC result in a non-linearized Philip curve
specified as
1−yt +
yt
xt
−kp(pit−pilt−1pi1−l)pit+βpEt
[
λpt+1
λpt
kp(pit+1−piltpi1−l)pit+1
yt+1
yt
]
= 0 (A.26)
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A.1.6 Capital Market
This sector solves the problem
Et
∞∑
0
λEt
[
qkt
(
It − ki2
( It
It−1
− 1
)2)− It
]
(A.27)
which generates the capital stock which evolves according to
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +
(
1− ki2
( It
It−1
− 1
)2)
It (A.28)
The real price of capital qkt is given by
1 = qkt
[
1− ki2
( It
It−1
−1
)2−ki( It
It−1
−1
)2 It
It−1
+βEEt
[λEt+
λEt
qkt+1ki
(It+1
It
−1
)(It+1
It
)2]]
(A.29)
A.2 Full Model Equations
Poor Household
Cpt
θNpt
φ = Wt + Cpt θV pt µptEt [Wt+1pit+1] (A.30)
1 = βpEt
( Cpt
Cpt+1
)θ (1 + rdpt
pit+1
) (A.31)
1 =
(
1 + rbpt
)
V pt C
p
t
θ + βpEt
( Cpt
Cpt+1
)θ (1 + rbpt
pit+1
) (A.32)
(
1 + rbpt
)
Bpit = µ
p
tEt [Wt+1Npitpit+1] (A.33)
Rich Household
Crt
θN rt
φ = Wt + Crt θV rt µrtEt [Wt+1pit+1] (A.34)
1 = βrEt
( Crt
Crt+1
)θ (1 + rdrt
pit+1
) (A.35)
1 =
(
1 + rbrt
)
V pt C
r
t
θ + βrEt
( Crt
Crt+1
)θ (1 + rbrt
pit+1
) (A.36)
(
1 + rbrt
)
Brit = µrtEt [Wt+1N ritpit+1] (A.37)
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Entrepreneur
qkt =
αYt
xtkt
+ Cet θvetµeEt
[
qkt+1pit+1(1− δ)
]
+ βeEt
( Cet
Cet+1
)θ
qkt+1(1− δ)
 (A.38)
1 = Cet θV et (1 + rbet ) + βeEt

(
Cet
Cet+1
)θ (1 + rbet
pit+1
) (A.39)
Wt = (1− α) Yt
xtNt
(A.40)
(1 + rbet )Bet = µetEt{qKt+1pi(t+1)(1− δ)Kit} (A.41)
1 = qkt
[
1− ki2
( It
It−1
−1
)2−ki( It
It−1
−1
)2 It
It−1
+βEEt
[λEt+
λEt
qkt+1ki
(It+1
It
−1
)(It+1
It
)2]]
(A.42)
1−yt +
yt
xt
−kp(pit−pilt−1pi1−l)pit+βpEt
[
λpt+1
λpt
kp(pit+1−piltpi1−l)pit+1
yt+1
yt
]
= 0 (A.43)
Financial Sector
Rbt = Rdt − kkb
(
Kbt (j)
Bt(j)
− V b
)(
Kbt (j)
Bt(j)
)2
(A.44)
Bft = Drt +Kbt (A.45)
Kbt = (1− δb)Kb,nt−1 + ωbJ b,nt−1 (A.46)
1−et+
(
Bit
Beft
)
+
(
Rbt
rbet
)
et−kbe
(
rbet
rbet−1
−1
)
rbet
rbet−1
+βeEt
{(
λpt+1
λpt
)
kbe
(
rbet+1
rbet
)2(
rbet+1
rbet
−1
)(
Bet+1
Bet
)}
= 0
(A.47)
1−brt +
(
Rbt
rbrt
)
brt −kbr
(
rbrt
rbrt−1
−1
)
rbrt
rbrt−1
+βeEt
{(
λpt+1
λpt
)
kbr
(
rbrt+1
rbrt
)2(
rbrt+1
rbrt
−1
)(
Brt+1
Brt
)}
= 0
(A.48)
−1+drt −drt
(
Rdt
rdrt
)
−kdr
(
rdrt
rdrt−1
−1
)
rdrt
rdrt−1
+βeEt
{(
λpt+1
λpt
)
kdr
(
rdrt+1
rdrt
)2(
rdrt+1
rdrt
−1
)(
Dft+1
Drt
)}
= 0
(A.49)
1−bpt +bpt
rbet
rbit
−kbi
(
rbit
rbit−1
−1
)
rbit
rbit−1
+βe
{(
λpt+1
λpt
)
kbi
(
rbit+1
rbit
)2(
rbit+1
rbit
−1
)(
Bit+1
Bit
)}
= 0
(A.50)
−1+dpt −dpt
rdrt
rdit
−kdi
(
rdit
rdit−1
−1
)
rdit
rdit−1
+βe
{(
λpt+1
λpt
)
kdi
(
rdit+1
rdit
)2(
rdit+1
rdit
−1
)(
Dit+1
Dit
)}
= 0
(A.51)
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A.2.1 Steady States
Poor Household
CpθNpφ = W + CpθV pµpWpi (A.52)
1 = βp
(
1 + rdp
pi
)
(A.53)
1 = (1 + rbp)V pCpθ + βp
(
1 + rbp
pi
)
(A.54)
(1 + rbp)Bp = µp [WNppi] (A.55)
Rich Household
CrθN rφ = W + CrθV rµrWpi (A.56)
1 = βr
(
1 + rdr
pi
)
(A.57)
1 = (1 + rbr)V pCrθ + βr
(
1 + rbr
pi
)
(A.58)
(1 + rbr)Br = µr [WN rpi] (A.59)
Entrepreneur
qk = αY
xk
+ Ceθveµe
[
qkpi(1− δ)
]
+ βe
[
qk(1− δ)
]
(A.60)
1 = CeθV e(1 + rbe) + βe
(
1 + rbe
pi
)
(A.61)
W = (1− α) Y
xN
(A.62)
(1 + rbe)Be = µe{qKpi(1− δ)K} (A.63)
qk = 1 (A.64)
1− y + 
y
x
= 0 (A.65)
Financial Sector
Rb = Rd − kkb
(
Kb
Bf
− V b
)(
Kb
Bf
)2
(A.66)
Bf = Dr +Kb (A.67)
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Kb = (1− δb)Kb + ωbJ b (A.68)
Rb
rbe
= 
e − 1
e
− B
i
eBef
(A.69)
Rb
rbr
= 
br − 1
br
(A.70)
Rd
rdr
= 
dr − 1
dr
(A.71)
rbe
rbi
= 
bp − 1
bp
(A.72)
rdr
rdi
= 
dp − 1
dp
(A.73)
A.2.2 Log-linearized Equations
Poor Household
r∗r̂
bp
t + B̂pt = µ̂pt + N̂pt + Etŵt+1 + Etp̂it+1 (A.74)
1 + θEtĉpt+1 + Etp̂it+1 = θĉpt +
(
rdpss
(1 + rdpss )2
)
r̂dpt (A.75)
ŵt = PH0(φn̂pt + θĉpt ) + PH1(µ̂pt + θĉpt + v̂pt + Etŵt+1 + Etp̂it+1) (A.76)
1 = PH00(1 + θĉPt + v̂
p
t + r∗r̂bpt ) + PH11[θ(ĉpt − ĉpt+1) + r∗r̂bpt − p̂it+1] (A.77)
PH0 =
Cpss
θNpss
φ
Wss
, PH1 = CpssθV pssµpsspiss, PH00 = CpssθV pss(1 + rbpss),
PH11 = βp
[
1 + rbpss
piss
]
, r∗ =
(
rbpss
(1 + rbpss)2
)
Rich Household
r∗∗r̂brt + B̂rt = µ̂rt + N̂ rt + Etŵt+1 + Etp̂it+1 (A.78)
1 + θEtĉrt+1 + Etp̂it+1 = θĉrt +
(
rdrss
(1 + rdrss )2
)
r̂drt (A.79)
ŵt = RH0(φn̂rt + θĉrt ) +RH1(µ̂
p
t + θĉrt + v̂rt + Etŵt+1 + Etp̂it+1) (A.80)
1 = RH00(1 + θĉrt + v̂rt + r∗r̂brt ) +RH11[θ(ĉrt − ĉrt+1) + r∗r̂brt − p̂it+1] (A.81)
RH0 =
Crss
θN rss
φ
Wss
, RH1 = CrssθV rssµrsspiss, RH00 = CrssθV rss(1 + rbrss),
RH11 = βr
[
1 + rbrss
piss
]
, r∗∗ =
(
rbrss
(1 + rbrss)2
)
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Firm
q̂kt = FS0(ŷt−k̂t)+FS1
(
θĉet + v̂et + µ̂et + Etq̂kt+1 + Etp̂it+1
)
+βe(1−δ)
(
θ(ĉet − Etĉet+1) + Etq̂kt+1
)
(A.82)
o = FS00
(
θĉet + v̂et + rber̂bet
)
+ FS11
(
θ(ĉet − Etĉet+1) + rber̂bet − Etp̂it+1
)
(A.83)
ŵt = ln(1− α) + lnx+ ŷt − n̂et (A.84)
r∗r̂bet + B̂et = µ̂et + k̂t + Etq̂kt+1 + Etp̂it+1 (A.85)
FS0 =
αyss
xkss
, FS1 = cessθvessµesspiss(1 − δ), FS00 = cessθvess(1 + rbess),
FS11 =
(
1 + rbess
piss
)
Financial Sector
r̂bet =
kbe
R∗e + (1 + βe)kbe
r̂bet−1 +
βekbe
R∗e + (1 + βe)kbe
Etr̂
be
t+1 +
eR∗
e + (1 + βe)kbe
R̂bt +
B∗
R∗e + (1 + βe)kbe
(B̂it − B̂et )
(A.86)
r̂drt =
kdr
R∗ddr + (1 + βe)kdr
r̂drt−1 +
βekdr
R∗ddr + (1 + βe)kdr
Etr̂
dr
t+1 +
R∗d
dr
R∗ddr + (1 + βe)kdr
r̂t +
D∗
R∗ddr + (1 + βe)kdr
(D̂it − D̂rt )
(A.87)
R∗ = R
b
ss
rbess
, B∗ = B
i
ss
Bess
, R∗d =
rss
rdrss
D∗ = D
i
ss
Drss
r̂brt =
kbr
br − (1 + βe)kbr r̂
br
t−1 +
βekbr
br − (1 + βe)kbrEtr̂
br
t+1 +
br − 1
br − (1 + βe)kbr R̂
b
t (A.88)
r̂bit =
kbi
bp − (1 + βe)kbi r̂
bi
t−1 +
βekbi
bp − (1 + βe)kbiEtr̂
bi
t+1 +
bp − 1
bp − (1 + βe)kbi r̂
be
t (A.89)
r̂dit =
kdi
dp − (1 + βe)kdi r̂
di
t−1+
βekdi
dp − (1 + βe)kdiEtr̂
di
t+1+
dp − 1
dp − (1 + βe)kdi r̂t
dr (A.90)
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